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ABSTRACT
The purpose o f this work is to offer a critical examination o f  Immanuel 
Kant’s ethic o f suicide. Kant’s suicidology marks an influential view 
regarding the moral stature o f suicide, yet one that remains incomplete in 
important respects. Because Kant’s moral views are rationalistic, they restrict 
moral consideration to rational entities. Many people who commit suicide are 
not rational at the time o f its commission, for they suffer from severe mental 
illness. Because o f this, Kant’s suicidology devastatingly excludes certain 
human demographics from moral consideration, current Canadian statistics 
indicating that such people mark one o f the highest populations at risk of 
committing suicide in the first place. This work contains a presentation, 
analysis, and critique o f Kant’s ethic o f suicide, leading to an attempt to state 
criteria for an adequate suicidology.
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I. Introduction
Once the reader has finished reading this text, roughly two hundred and fifty of the world’s
inhabitants will have killed themselves.1 Since human beings have the ability to end their
own life; since human beings do commit suicide, the question arises as to whether it is
morally permissible for them to do so.
Albert Camus characterized the problem of suicide as one of the most fundamental
philosophical problems:
There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. 
Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the 
fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest—whether or not the world 
has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories— 
comes afterwards. These are games: one must first answer.2
The discussion of suicide within the history of philosophy is by no means
restricted to Camus; the issue of suicide is present throughout the writing of Sartre3,
Dostoyevsky4, Kant, Hume5, Seneca6, Schopenhauer7, to name a few. Despite Camus’
powerful convictions, suicide’s urgency as a philosophical problem has been largely
overlooked in favour of other problems in many respects. Consequently, regardless of the
exigency of its solution, the problem of suicide remains shadowy, imperative, and irresolute.
Since normative ethics deals with how human beings ought to act; since suicide is a human
act, it follows that any decision regarding whether or not human beings are permitted to
commit suicide needs to be informed by normative ethics. As the current situation indicates,
1 The World Health Organization (2002) reported findings that “someone around the globe commits 
suicide every 40 seconds”. See Canadian Mental Health Association (2003).
2 The Myth o f  Sisyphus, page 11.
3 Suicide is a theme running throughout Sartre’s fiction, especially his Roads to Freedom trilogy.
4 At one point in Crime and Punishment, Raskalnikov contemplates the possibility o f self­
termination.
5 See Hume’s On Suicide.
6 See Seneca’s Letters from a Stoic, for example, letter LXXVII. Also, for a detailed examination of  
both the Stoic and Kantian view regarding suicide, see Seidler’s “Kant and the Stoics on Suicide” 
(1983).
7 See Schopenhauer’s “On Suicide” in Schopenhauer, Arthur (1994): Philosophical Writings. Edited
1
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more work needs to be done on the issue of suicide.
This work is focused on one question: is it or is it not morally permissible to 
commit suicide? This question leads to other questions of equal importance. For instance, 
once a conclusion to the former question has been reached (assuming such a conclusion is 
possible), what would the encapsulating ethical paradigm look like which satisfies it? 
Furthermore, can such a theoretical ethic of suicide reach the goal of sound practical 
application in human individual and social reality at large? It is not the purpose of this 
discourse to seek answers to the above questions directly, but rather to offer a critique of an 
influential ethic of suicide that itself attempts to do so. Relying heavily on an exposition and 
critique of the views of Immanuel Kant regarding (what he terms) self-murder, my primary 
goal is positive in nature. By examining Kant’s views on the moral standing of suicide, we 
become better suited to establish certain principles that a sound ethic of suicide ought to 
encompass. Hence, the positive argument found in the closing chapter here is an attempt to 
establish sound guidelines for a normative ethic of suicide, based largely on apparent 
shortcomings in Kant’s ethic of suicide, which are manifested through the insights generated 
by a negative critique of his general suicidology.8
The specific problem under scrutiny, then, is whether reason alone can provide 
proper moral guidance with respect to the act of suicide. In other words, is Kant correct in 
arguing that ‘suicide is morally impermissible because it contradicts the moral law (in 
various ways) which reason sets for itself?’ Kant’s account is complicated and metaphysical; 
it is also incomplete. It is my contention that Kant’s moral philosophy cannot offer a 
complete solution to the problem of suicide for four main reasons, each of which will be 
elaborated in Chapter Three. A brief summary of these reasons now follows.
by Wolfgang Schirmacher. New York: Continuum Publishing Company.
8 Although suicidology is a broad term that has been identified with “the study o f suicide,” it will be 
used in the present discourse to refer to the moral issues surrounding suicide, and is for the most part 
interchangeable with “ethics o f  suicide”.
2
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1. Universal application and context sensitivity: The inability o f Kant’s moral 
doctrine to account for all cases o f suicide, exemplified by the 'exceptions’ to his rules 
(especially the casuistic questions as found in The Metaphysics o f Morals). Kant affords 
certain quasi-exceptions to the immorality of suicide, which suggests that whatever fine-line 
dictates where specific cases of suicide fall along the continuum between morally 
permissible and morally reprehensible needs to be examined and clarified. Judging by 
Kant’s ‘mysterious’ casuistic questions in The Metaphysics o f Morals, these fine-lines 
continue to be vague and unhelpful.
2. The ‘irrationality’ of suicide: Kant’s emphasis and reliance on rationality as the 
dictator o f the moral law, in effect reason as setting laws for itself. This may be a sound 
assessment of suicide with respect to those human beings who are rational (although, even 
this claim remains controversial). However, the point is that Kant’s doctrine fails to account 
for those human beings who are not rational at the time of their suicide, i.e. those human 
beings who are irrational. A substantial number of human beings fall into this category of 
lacking rationality, especially where the issue of suicide is concerned. For example, young 
children and adolescents, people who are diagnosed with severe mental illness, and people 
who are extremely intoxicated are all susceptible to suicide, and are all characteristically 
irrational.9 Since such is the case, then an accurate view of the moral standing of suicide 
needs to take these demographics into account. In other words, it surely cannot be the case 
that the same moral theory that applies to rational agents insofar as they are rational may 
equally apply to those agents who are not rational.
9 Throughout this work, when the term “irrationality” is used in describing people who are mentally 
ill, it is assumed that the evaluation is being made from a perspective external to the beings in 
question. In certain instances, the terms “arational” or “non-rational” may be more appropriate. Since 
rationality comes in degrees, and since the mentally ill may range from having mildly to severely 
impaired rational faculties, different descriptions may be appropriate in different cases. While the 
term ‘irrational’ is used throughout, it is understood that at times such beings may be more aptly
3
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3. Intervention: The impracticality o f Kant’s theoretical conjectures when it comes
to informing prevention strategies. A sound ethic of suicide needs to inform prevention 
practices. However, it will be shown that Kant’s ethic is inadequate for the purpose of 
informing prevention and intervention strategies in all cases.
4. Incomplete account of the nature of (the phenomenology of) death: Kant’s
failure to attend to the phenomenology o f death with any significant (moral) insight, leaving 
the question o f the nature o f the result o f suicide open, and hence any subsequent 
judgements regarding suicide wanting o f a secure foundation. If we accept the life / death 
dichotomy as Being exhaustive, then any act that is done in life, let alone done to end life 
(and hence to initiate death), must take into account, and be consistent with, the nature of 
death. Kant offers nothing by way of considering the nature of death in a moral context, and 
hence his suicidology is incomplete. It is not to say that a deontological ethical theory is 
ultimately inadequate; it is merely to say that reason must be informed regarding the 
consequences of an action, even to know whether such an action ought to be sought out as 
an end in itself in the first place. Self-preservation, as not-killing-oneself is an end that 
largely assumes the righteousness of maintaining life, an idea itself based on a relatively 
unrehearsed and ultimately uncertain phenomenology of death.
In sum, as will become clear throughout this discourse, a proper verdict regarding 
the moral standing of suicide (whatever it may turn out to be) must be context-sensitive, 
include all human beings under consideration, inform intervention strategies, and have as 
one of its foundational tenets an understanding of the phenomenology of death. Kant’s 
suicidology fails in several respects in meeting these relevant guidelines, and hence offers at
labelled arational. For the critique of Kant made herein, arationality o f  the mentally ill (or the 
mentally ill being entirely without reason) is not required.
4
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best an incomplete account of the moral standing of suicide. An elucidation of the 
importance and support of these conjectures will make up the bulk of the final chapter.
In the first chapter, an account of Kant’s general moral philosophy is given, one 
more conservative than controversial. Although such an exposition is crucial for the task at 
hand, it serves merely to draw out the main tenets of Kant’s overall moral philosophy, 
leaving an exposition of the finer details for more developed works currently in the literature 
(see for example O’Neill (1988), and Rawls (2000)). Such an examination lays the 
groundwork for Chapter Two, where the focus is restricted to an examination of Kant’s 
views regarding the moral standing of suicide specifically. In the final chapter, our previous 
examination of Kant’s arguments prove valuable for establishing some preliminary 
guidelines for the establishment of a sound ethic of suicide.
If the problem of suicide can be viewed as a fundamental moral problem, then the 
question of whether suicide is morally impermissible or otherwise becomes of primary 
concern if any sound general moral theory (and practice) is to be conceived of and 
established. More importantly, theoretical soundness would provide grounds for a solidified 
perspective concerning the successful manoeuvring of suicidal situations in everyday life, 
which is of paramount concern since such situations constitute concrete examples of the 
reason why suicide is a moral dilemma to begin with.
Before proceeding, two preliminary notes are necessary: an explication of what 
suicide is, and a characterization of why it is taken to be a problem.
1.1 Defining Suicide
“Suicide” as a concept enjoys a myriad of definitions that appear both within the 
philosophical literature and elsewhere. It is a truism that suicide happens; it is also for the 
most part agreed upon as to what characteristic properties of suicide distinguishes it from, 
say, murder, euthanasia, kamikaze, mass suicide, prolonged self-destructive behaviour
5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(cigarette smoking for example), accidental self-immolation, et cetera. I offer a few 
definitions of suicide by way of elucidating what the concept means, which helps in 
formulating an operational definition of suicide to be used throughout this text:
According to Immanuel Kant, suicide10 is “the total killing of oneself’, that is, the 
intentional physical termination of one’s life. (Mutilating oneself, interestingly enough, is 
considered by Kant to be a partial or incomplete suicide)}1 Furthermore, Kant contends that 
“wilfully killing oneself can be called murdering oneself.. .only if it can be proved that it is 
in general a crime committed against one’s own person or also, through one’s killing 
oneself, against another (as when a pregnant person takes her life)”.12 Whether or not 
committing suicide is rightly considered a criminal offence is orthogonal to our current 
study. However, considering the idea that moral philosophy has historically influenced legal 
constitution and practice, answers to the questions central here could conceivably inform 
legal policies and practice.
Another definition of suicide is offered by Edwin S. Shneidman,13 the leading 
suicidoligist of his day. According to Shneidman, suicide is defined as the “human act of 
self-inflicted, self-intended cessation,” and “is a conscious act of self-induced annihilation, 
best understood as a multidimensional malaise in a needful individual who defines an issue
10 In “Suicidology and the Right to Die,” Margaret P. Battin writes: “The German Selbstmord, the 
term most frequently used in ordinary spoken and written discourse, carries extremely negative 
connotations, no doubt associated with its literal meaning, self-murder, including the implication o f  
moral wrong” (390). Battin goes on to argue that “German’s fourth term for self-caused death, 
however, is quite another matter. Freitod (literally free death or voluntary death) is a positive term, 
free from connotations o f either moral wrongness or pathology” (391). The fact that Kant used the 
former term to denote suicide may be beside the point; however, the fact that the German language 
has such a term as the latter suggests that Kant could have been more neutral when assigning a term 
to denote such a serious moral problem as suicide.
11 MM, page 176.
12 MM, page 176.
13 Edwin S. Shneidman was a leading suicidoligist whose groundbreaking work with suicide notes 
led to his label as being the founder o f  the aforementioned discipline. Suicidology, although having 
different definitions for different people, can be summed up as the discipline whose area o f study is 
suicide, its various dimensions, prevention, and phenomena.
6
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for which the suicide is perceived as the best solution”.14 Not only is the idea of “intent” 
present in Kant’s definition also observed in Shneidman’s characterization of suicide, but 
Shneidman also notes the importance of psychological considerations, insinuating that 
suicide ‘victims’ are proximally and for the most part people who are suffering in some way, 
or are otherwise “needful”. This definition seems prima facie incomplete because it 
apparently restricts the suicidal person to a human being lacking or deficient in some way, 
suppressing the fact that fully functional human beings, people who are not needful in any 
relevant sense, equally commit suicide. In other words, although it is true that psychological 
factors play a role in a great number of suicides, to define suicide as necessarily involving 
psychological malaise is to over-restrict its defining traits, and hence to reject certain cases 
of genuine suicide from falling within its domain.
Victor Cosculluela, in The Ethics o f Suicide, offers another definition of suicide. 
Before arguing that “it is unlikely in the extreme that any analysis of suicide will ever 
become universally received or that there is an analysis which is both plausible and perfectly 
precise,” Cosculluela defines suicide as follows:
Person S commits suicide at time T if and only if:
1. S intends at T to bring about his own death.
2. S acts at T in such a way so as to bring about his [or her] own death.
3. The intention specified in (1) causes (through a number of general 
actions) the action described in (2).
4. The causal route from the intention specified in (1) to the action 
described in (2) is more or less in accordance with S’s action-plan, and
5. S acts voluntarily in bringing about his [or her] own death.15
Yet another definition of suicide can be found in any standard dictionary. For example:
su-i-cide n. 1. The intentional taking of one’s own life. 2. Self- 
inflicted political, social, or commercial ruin. 3. One who has 
taken his own life. v.i. -cid-ed, cid ing Informal To commit
14 Maris (1993), page 3.
15 See page Cosculluela (1995). Although for the most part I think Cosculluela drastically 
misinterprets Kant’s overall doctrine (especially his suicidology), he does stress the importance o f  a 
sound definition o f suicide i f  the ethics o f suicide as a sub-discipline is to be fruitful, not to mention 
successful. At bottom, however, this definition, albeit more technical in nature, greatly resembles 
Kant’s definition o f  suicide provided above.
7
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suicide. [ < NL suicide < L sui of oneself + caedere to kill ]16 
The point is clear: there exist many definitions of the concept “suicide”. Nevertheless, 
certain characteristics are common across them all, viz., suicide is something like wilful self­
death. Consequently, for our present purposes, the term “suicide” is defined as follows:
(SI): Suicide is the wilful and intended ending of one’s own 
existence, rid of outside force or coercion, regardless of the 
particular means or motive.
I include “regardless of particular means or motive” since it is irrelevant, when considering
the defining traits of suicide, why a human being wilfully ends her existence in the sense of
what drove her to consider suicide, or what considerations led to her intending to commit
suicide in the first place. The important question is not how she ends her life, but rather what
her intentions were underlying her acting the way she did. This is a subtle yet important
distinction since someone may both end their life without intending to (in which case it does
not seem accurate to label the act as a case of suicide, strictly speaking), or may equally be
motivated to kill herself through considerations of others, or self-sacrifice, or unsound
reasoning, or delusional beliefs, or through the hope of a better ‘afterlife,’ et cetera. Such
cases as the latter are nevertheless all instances of suicide since the intentions were to self-
terminate. Admittedly this definition is not immune to objection or appeal, yet it will
nevertheless serve the needs of our present discussion sufficiently.
By way of clarification, we shall see that, for Kant, the idea of motive is central to
classifying whether cases of suicide are morally permissible or otherwise. In fact, some
motives are counter-dutiful (and hence morally reprehensible), while others are dutiful (and
hence morally praiseworthy). The point made above is not that the motive forces behind a
suicidal act are irrelevant to a discussion of whether suicide is morally permissible or
otherwise, but merely that it is irrelevant when deciding whether a case of suicide is actually
a case o f suicide in the first place. Where a definition of “suicide” is what is being sought,
16 Funk and Wagnall (1989).
8
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we must assume the action to have a motive in the sense of being intentional, but the specific 
content of that motive is irrelevant.
The definition offered here (SI) may be considered a minimalist conception of 
suicide. This is because it concerns only those suicides where one individual is involved. 
Cases of assisted euthanasia, community (mass) suicides, ritual suicide, suicide pacts, and so 
on may not fall under this definition, and hence the conclusions drawn here are not 
necessarily readily applicable to such sub-classes of suicide, generally speaking. The idea is 
that only once we have established clear and determinate conclusions regarding the ‘most 
basic’ type of suicidal case (i.e. one’s involving only a single agent) can we then safely 
proceed to cases that may be more complicated in nature (due to their involvement of 
additional people).
With a working definition of suicide firmly in place, a discussion of why suicide is 
a problem is now in order.
1.2 Why Is Suicide a Problem ?
Why is the wilful and unforced termination of one’s own existence a problem? Millions of 
dollars are spent in Canada each year in trying to grasp why people commit such an act, 
educating people regarding its problematic nature (both individually and socially), and, 
perhaps most importantly, setting up initiatives geared towards its prevention (whether 
clinical, pharmacological, or otherwise). If no complete ethic of suicide has hitherto been 
established; if no exhaustive understanding of its nature has been grasped, then why has so 
much effort been exerted surrounding a solution to the problem o f  suicide? In short, how are 
we sure that it is a problem to begin with?
Actions are considered problematic in large part due to the negative effects 
rendered by those actions. In a Kantian sense, the consequences of an action are considered 
in two ways. First, measuring the results of an action is relevant when considering whether
9
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that action is universalizable, that is, eligible for becoming a moral law. Secondly, the 
effects an action has on the acting being’s rationality and autonomy must be taken into 
account as well. For example, in Kant’s discussion of drunkenness in MM, he measures the 
effects of excessive consumption of fermented drink in order to deem such an action as a 
vice rather than a virtue. According to Kant, “a human being who is drunk is like a mere 
animal,” and is “not to be treated as a human being”.17 Presumably, this is the case since, 
through excessive drinking, such a human being debases her ability to reason, and 
consequently acts more animalistic than human. If the consequences of excessive drinking 
were not determined in the first place (drunkenness), and their resulting effects measured (a 
diminished ability to reason clearly), then Kant would have no grounds for deeming the 
excessive use of drink as morally impermissible (or permissible). The act of suicide is 
analogous to drunkenness in the sense that it is an action that can only be deemed 
problematic (or otherwise) once its effects have been determined and assessed. Although 
Kant undoubtedly considers the consequences of actions, he is interested in what happens to 
rationality and autonomy in the wake of performing an action, rather than measuring the 
amount of resulting pleasure (something the hedonistic consequentialist is interested in).
The effects of suicide have been determined: through committing suicide, the 
agent dies; hence, the factual effect of suicide is nothing other than the cessation of the 
suicide victim. However, although the effect of suicide has been determined, how well have 
its effects been assessed? It is at least prima facie possible that the effects of suicide are not 
negative, or even something to be avoided. If such were the case, it would be premature to 
deem the act of suicide as problematic (in either an individual or social respect), at least in 
the sense of “problematic” suggested above. This issue is taken up again in the final chapter. 
For now, let it suffice that the idea of suicide being a problem in the first place is itself 
problematic. It involves at least two difficult issues: the moral standing of suicide (which is
17 MM, page 180.
10
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largely assumed to be negative in nature) and the phenomenology of death (also something 
largely assumed negative).
Taken in this light, it is not a question then of how to prevent suicide, but rather 
one of whether suicide ought to be prevented in the first place. This theme was articulated as 
far back as Plato. After receiving his death-sentence by the Athenian authorities, Socrates 
spoke:
To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise 
when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know. No 
one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings 
for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of 
evils. And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe 
that one knows what one does not know.18
Plato’s point here is one of the sparks of our inquiry, one that is attended to in Chapter
Three. The point for now is this: suicide is viewed as a problem largely because death is
viewed as something negative in nature, something to be avoided, something no person is
better off seeking as opposed to remaining alive. The question now becomes: is suicide, in
this regard, really a problem'?
Some philosophers, including David Hume, have argued that suicide may not in
fact be a morally impermissible action for human beings to commit. In On Suicide, Hume
writes:
A hair, a fly, an insect, is able to destroy this mighty being whose 
life is of such importance. Is it an absurdity to suppose that 
human prudence may lawfully dispose of what depends on such 
insignificant causes?
It would be no crime in me to divert the Nile or Danube 
from its course, were I able to effect such purposes. Where then is 
the crime of turning a few ounces of blood from their natural 
channel!19
Others, like Arthur Schopenhauer for example, have confronted the relationship between 
suicide and the phenomenology of death head on, highlighting the nature of suicide through
18 Plato’s Apology, page 33.
19 Hume, On Suicide, page 5.
11
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its dependence on a metaphysical understanding of death. Thus, in his “Schopenhauer on the
Ethics of Suicide,” Dale Jacquette writes of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics:
The philosopher is not to choose suicide as a bad faith affirmation 
of the will to life in an abject effort to avoid suffering.. .Yet for a 
subject to have any sort of preference about living or dying 
contradicts what is supposed to be the saint’s absolute 
indifference to life and death. As such, it is just another 
manifestation, rather than an overcoming, of the will to life, even, 
paradoxically, when it embraces the idea of an ideal death. The 
main problem in Schopenhauer’s philosophy is not the internal 
conflict of will which it deprecates, but the inconsistencies in 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism as he tries in a more positive light to 
demystify the meaning of death.20
From these considerations, suicide is seen as problematic in a philosophical light; 
the issue of suicide is problematic with respect to uncertainties regarding its moral standing 
and its close tie to the phenomenology of death. The problematicity of suicide viewed either 
from widely held social or philosophical perspectives, although different in nature, both 
demand the same conclusion: we have presently little reason to conclude that suicide is 
either a problem or otherwise since we have yet to establish an infallible verdict regarding 
its effect (death), nor, consequently, its moral standing (whether it is right or wrong).
Having said this, we must however start from the assumption that suicide is a 
relevant issue, both social and philosophical. At least intuitively, the idea that people 
wilfully end their own existences makes one’s stomach turn. A drive to live seemingly 
permeates human kind, in which case the occurrence of individuals wilfully seeking out their 
own termination seems unnatural, wrong, and irrational. However, could this feeling merely 
be an unfounded assumption? A taboo-like social construction? A dogmatically instilled 
appeal to history or authority? If suicide is not really a problem, then all of its individual, 
social, and philosophical ties need to be drastically re-evaluated, not unlike what Nietzsche21
20 Jacquette ((2000), page 54.
21 In Twilight o f  the Idols, Nietzsche writes: “Socrates was a misunderstanding: the entire morality o f  
improvement, the Christian included, has been a misunderstanding...The harshest daylight, 
rationality at any cost, life bright, cold, circumspect, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to the
12
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demanded with respect to metaphysics and religion in general. If suicide is not taken as an 
issue in the beginning, however, then no attention would be given to seeking answers to 
such pending questions that surround it, and hence no real conclusive understanding of its 
nature and moral standing would ever be reached. Suicide, therefore, is treated here as a 
fundamental issue in normative ethics and social life in general. Since this is the case, a brief 
clarification of the issue of suicide as it currently stands is relevant.
Based on current national statistics in Canada, suicide rests as the eleventh leading 
cause of death in the country each year.22 Worldwide, it is estimated that one human being 
commits suicide during every forty seconds that pass.23 As shocking as these numbers are, 
they become even more so when it is noted that the highest number of suicides across age 
groups comes from people between the years of adolescence and young adulthood (roughly 
ages fifteen to twenty-five). In 2003, roughly seventy people under the age of twenty-five 
ended their existence for every one hundred thousand people in Canada.
The widespread prevalence and scope of suicide has been noted throughout the 
world, not just in Canada. Michael Cholbi describes the current situation in the United States 
as follows:
The chances are good that each of us will someday confront a 
person close to us contemplating suicide. Every year in the United 
States, suicide attempts lead to 30,000 deaths and nearly half a 
million visits to the emergency room. This number does not even 
include a still larger group that contemplates suicide or forms 
suicidal intentions but never actually initiates a suicide attempt.
And for each such suicidal person, there are numerous other 
persons—friends, family members, and health care providers 
among them— for whom a troubling moral question should arise:
How, if at all, may I act in order to prevent another person from 
taking her life?24
instincts, has itself been no more than a form o f sickness, another form of sickness— and by no means 
a way back to ‘virtue1, to ‘health*, to happiness...To have to combat one's instincts— that is the 
formula for decadence-, as long as life is ascending, happiness and instinct are one” (page 44).
22 Statistics Canada, 1997.
23 WHO (2002), in Canadian Mental Health Association (2003).
24 Cholbi (2002), page 245.
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Because so many human beings choose suicide as their last act as living beings, and because 
so many of the aforementioned are members of the world’s youth, then suicide is an issue 
whose importance ought to be assumed for further inquiry, if only tentatively.
Having set out these two preliminaries—what is meant by the concept “suicide” 
and why it is seen as an issue for human beings—we are now adequately prepared for the 
main task at hand. In the next chapter I examine Kant’s moral philosophy in general, 
focusing on an elucidation of rationality and human freedom as two foundational tenets of 
his moral thought, the role Kant reserves for the categorical imperative, and what criteria a 
maxim must meet in order to be morally acted upon. In Chapter Two, I offer an examination 
of Kant’s ethic of suicide specifically, based on what he wrote in Lectures on Ethics (LE), 
Fundamental Principles o f the Metaphysics o f Morals (FPMM), and The Metaphysics o f 
Morals (MM). Kant’s arguments for the moral impermissibility of suicide are divided into 
the categories of those pertaining to self-love and those that violate human freedom; both are 
examined therein. In the final chapter, some general suggestions for the eventual 
establishment of a sound ethic of suicide emerge, ideas based largely on the examination of 
Kant’s suicidology that appears in the preceding chapters.
14
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II. Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Our main task is to outline Immanuel Kant’s ethical thought on the whole. I do this in three 
sections. The first deals with Kant’s idea of the practical moral law for human beings as 
grounded in both their rational nature and their condition as free and autonomous agents. 
These two ideas comprise the basic tenets of Kant’s moral philosophy. This discussion leads 
to an examination of the various formulations of the practical law of morality itself (the 
categorical imperative) in the second section. Because the categorical imperative is closely 
connected to the notions of subjective maxims, duty, and a good will, each are then 
discussed in turn. Once an understanding of what Kant believes is supposed to guide human 
action has been reached, we must understand the conditions a maxim is obligated to meet if 
it is to satisfy the pure practical law of morality. Therefore, the purpose of section three is to 
examine the two broad forms of contradiction to which maxims may succumb, namely, 
contradictions in conception and contradictions of volition.
By the close of this chapter a general overview of Kant’s moral philosophy will be 
in place. From there a thorough examination of Kant’s suicidology is undertaken.
2.1 Moral Agents as Rational and Autonomous
2.1.1 Rationality, A Priori
In FPMM, Kant argues for the existence of a moral law that is both synthetic and a priori. 
According to Kant, a synthetic judgement (or proposition) is one where the conceptual 
content of the subject is amplified by a predicate that is not previously contained in the 
subject. Such judgements are distinguished by analytic judgements, which are those where 
the subject of a proposition contains the concept of the predicate within itself, and hence 
constitutes a connection through identity. According to Kant, synthetic judgements “add to 
the concept of the subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and
15
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which no analysis could possibly extract from it”.25 The moral law is synthetic since its 
conception is necessarily connected to the will of all rational beings as such, yet it is not 
necessarily made concrete through their actions. In other words, the moral law remains an 
ideal guiding principle of action, ever-present, yet disregard-able (albeit immorally) in real 
human action. The moral ought does not imply that an action is actually done. Nevertheless, 
certain ways of acting are necessarily attached to the free and rational will as such. Kant 
writes:
I connect the act with the will without presupposing any condition 
resulting from any inclination, but a priori, and therefore 
necessarily.. .This is accordingly a practical proposition which 
does not deduce the willing of an action by mere analysis from 
another already presupposed (for we have not such a perfect will) 
but connects it immediately with the conception of the will of a 
rational being, as something not contained in it.26
Here the further idea of a condition of the moral law being a priori is presented.
A judgement (or proposition) that is a priori is one which does not draw on
sensory experience, is absolutely necessary, and is universal.27 If a judgement is thought to
be otherwise (this is to say not necessary)-, if its applicability is contingent; or if its
conception draws upon sensory experience in any way, then the judgement is not said to be
a priori, but rather a posteriori. According to Kant, morality has an a priori foundation in
pure reason alone, that is, outside of all possible experience. As we shall see in the next
section, this a priori foundation is none other than the conception of the moral law as such,
articulated through the various formulations of the categorical imperative.
Rational beings qua rational do not need to learn what is moral, for it is already
established within their nature insofar as they are rational.28 In other words, rational agents
25 CPR, page 48 (Bll).
26 FPMM, page 48.
27 See CPR, page 43 (B2-B3).
28 This is not to say that Kant adopts the Platonic view that all knowledge is preordained in the soul, 
forgotten at birth, and re-established through recollection (learning). Rather, morality is a 
consequence of rationality. Rationality, moreover, is a consequence of human nature (at least part of
16
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are aware of the moral law a priori through their very ability to reason. Without rationality,
such a moral law would not exist in the first place. Kant is explicit on the idea that the moral
law stems from pure reason alone (at least initially):
Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being 
an aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial 
to the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an 
absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of 
action is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which 
alone experience can furnish.29
Through the mere conception of the moral law, one realizes its inevitably entailing the
further thought that such a conception of morality is absolutely necessary. Like the concepts
of space and time, the categorical imperative is apodictic and immovable from pure reason.
In other words, the moral law as a law given in pure reason is attributed to all rational
agents, and is therefore universal.
By accepting the moral law as being given a priori, Kant is not suggesting that
experience plays absolutely no role in moral discourse whatsoever. In fact, experiential
judgement is required in concrete situations in order to aid agents in applying rules to
conduct, learning from previous experience, and using new and old information alike to
inform their present (and future) moral judgements.30 In light of this, Kant distinguishes
morality from practical anthropology, the former founded on pure reason alone, the latter
founded on and guided by experience in the world. In Anthropology From a Pragmatic
Point o f View (AP), Kant describes practical anthropology as follows:
The sum total of findings generated by pragmatic anthropology as 
to the classification of [human beings] and the characterization of 
[their] development is as follows: [Human beings are] destined by 
[their] reason to live in a society of other people, and in this
it).
29 FPMM, page 54.
30 According to Kant, “No doubt these [moral] laws require judgment sharpened by experience, in 
order on the one hand to distinguish in what cases they are applicable, and on the other to procure for 
them access to the will o f the man...Since man is acted on by so many inclinations that, though 
capable o f  the idea o f a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it effective in concreto 
in his life” {FPMM, page 12).
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society [have] to cultivate [themselves], civilize [themselves], and 
apply [themselves] to a moral purpose by the arts and sciences.
No matter how great [their] animalistic inclination may be 
[toward]... happiness, [they are] still destined to make 
[themselves] worthy of humanity by actively struggling with the 
obstacles that cling to [them] because of the crudity of [their] 
nature.
Man must, therefore, be educated to the good. But he 
who is to educate him is again a human who still finds himself in 
the crudity of nature. This human...is expected to bring about 
what he himself is still in need of. This accounts for man’s 
continuous deviation from his destiny and his ever-repeated return 
to it.31
What this amounts to saying is that what is given a priori must subsequently be applied and 
perfected a posteriori,32 What guides these further considerations is not morality alone, but 
morality coupled with human experience in the world.
Since the possibility for morality (and, consequently, the possibility for moral 
obligation) is founded on rationality, it follows that reason inflexibly commands what the 
agent ought to do. Reason is the determining source of human moral action, its rules given 
outside of experience, where the agent proceeds to act from the conceptions of such laws. 
Because rationality exists as an end in itself, and because human beings are rational beings, 
human beings themselves are a priori ends in themselves as well.33 In essence, reason 
presents itself with an ideal conception of the moral law and then directs the agent’s action 
based on those very same laws. Despite the force of reason in giving moral imperatives, 
however, human beings do not always follow the self-prescribed moral law. For Kant, such 
failures often result from conflicting drives of human nature. On the one hand, we may be 
swayed by natural drives or temptations to act in certain ways; yet, on the other hand, reason 
commands an agent’s conformity to the moral law unexceptionally.
31 AP, page 242.
32 In FPMM, Kant writes: “...there arises a two-fold metaphysic— a metaphysic o f  nature and a 
metaphysic o f  morals. Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with 
Ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name o f practical anthropology, the name 
morality being appropriated to the rational part” (page 10).
33 FPMM, pages. 56-57.
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According to Kant, therefore, the nature of human beings is dichotomous. It is 
divided between two components, namely, reason, on the one hand, and instinct, desire and 
inclination on the other hand. The rational (or intelligible or noumenal) aspect of human 
nature concerns a human being’s ability to rationally and freely determine and choose ends 
for themselves, henceforth realizing those ends within the realm of nature. The intelligible 
character of an agent is, according to Kant, “the cause of those same actions as appearances, 
but which does not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility, and is not itself an 
appearance”.34 Kant takes it to be a postulate of pure practical reason that part of a human’s 
being lies beyond experience in the things in-themselves. Opposed to this, the instinctual (or 
sensible or phenomenal) aspect of human nature concerns an agent’s natural condemnation 
or requirement to seek certain ends, for example seeking food for the satisfaction of hunger. 
As an entity belonging to the sensible realm, human beings have an empirical component 
‘whereby her actions, as appearances, stand in thoroughgoing connection with other 
appearances in accordance with the unvarying laws of nature’. From the idea that human 
beings possess a sensual character, Kant suggests that human beings are equally 
appearances, or sensual entities. In other words, we can also see ourselves as mere things?5 
If we are not careful, our instincts as beings belonging to the sensible world may take over 
control and sway our actions towards ends inconsiderate of intelligible ends, which is to say 
ends inconsiderate of morality.
The objective law of morality, however, acts as a guiding light or compass of 
human action in the face of human beings’ phenomenal nature. Human volition, as the 
willing of a subject that is both noumenal and phenomenal, is necessarily faced with cases of 
conflict between the two competing natures. Whereas the role Nature has assigned to 
inclination is to obtain happiness and the satisfaction of basic needs for survival, in a sense
34 CPR, page 468.
35 CPR, page 468.
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dealing exclusively with relationships concentrating on the means towards happiness and
other contingent ends, reason has been assigned a different role. Reason has the purpose of
acting in accordance with objective laws, toward the end of establishing a good will and
moral character. Kant writes:
[We] must admit that the judgement of those who would very 
much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason 
gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who 
would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or 
ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but 
that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our 
existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for 
happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, 
be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of 
man must, for the most part, be postponed.36
The fact that morality is founded on rationality makes up one of two basic tenets of 
Kant’s moral thought. By way of foreshadowing our later critique, the fact that Kant takes 
rationality as a fundamental tenet of morality is worrisome with respect to suicide, since 
many human beings who commit suicide are not rational at the time of their suicide. The 
worry is that, as irrational, such human beings are not considered under Kant’s moral 
doctrine, and hence receive none of its associated moral guidance. Yet, as human beings, 
such people both equally do commit suicide, and may be equally deserving of moral 
appraisal. For now, however, the second basic tenet of Kant’s moral theory needs to be 
discussed: human freedom and autonomy of the will.
2.1.2 Freedom and Autonomy of the Will
As discussed in MM, freedom or rational self-determination, according to Kant, is the only 
innate right of human agents,37 and it necessarily entails equality, self-ruling, being outside 
reproach, and reciprocity within the community. Kant writes:
Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational being
36 FPMM, page 20.
37 See “There is Only One Innate Right,” MM, page 30.
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it must regard itself as free. That is to say, the will of such a being 
cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom. This 
idea must therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to 
every rational being.38
Every rational being is conceived of as a being that is free. The practical law of morality 
becomes a guide for action through the rational faculty of all human beings, dictating what is 
reasonable to do in order to reach their goals, in the face of preserving their fundamental 
freedom. It is reason guiding itself; free action in conformity with rational laws. Kant 
continues:
What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is 
the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition:
The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the 
principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have 
as an object itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the 
formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of 
morality, so that the free will and a will subject to moral laws are 
one and the same.39
At the outset it is worth mentioning that Kant does not pretend to offer an infallible
argument proving the existence of human freedom. In fact, in his Critique o f Practical
Reason (CPrR), Kant makes it explicit that the idea of freedom can in no way be proven
apodictically. Freedom as the ground of human causality and action (at least in their
noumenal orientation) is not concretely exemplified in reality, since, as appearances, objects
in the world are not open to penetration regarding their true motive forces. Nevertheless,
rational moral agents are assumed to be free. Kant writes:
The determination of the causality of beings in the sensible world 
can as such never be unconditioned, and yet for every series of 
conditions there must necessarily be something unconditioned 
and so too a causality that is altogether self-determining. Hence 
the idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not a 
need but, as far as its possibility is concerned, an analytic 
principle of pure speculative reason. It is, however, absolutely 
impossible to give anywhere in experience an example of it, since 
among the causes of things as appearances no determination of 
causality would be absolutely unconditioned can be found; hence
38 FPMM, page 80.
39 FPMM, page 78.
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we could defend the thought of a freely acting cause, when we 
apply this to a being in the sensible world, only insofar as this 
being is also regarded.. .as a noumenal.. .”.40
From this it is clear that, according to Kant, the practical existence of human freedom can
(and must) be assumed, even if this assumption is based solely on theoretical necessity and
metaphysical speculation. Having said this, despite the existence of freedom being for the
most part postulated, its role in Kant’s moral thought is crucial and undeniable. Freedom
from outward and inward determination (inclination), manifested in a human being’s ability
to choose based on rational exercise, becomes the canon for a self-determining will in all
rational beings as such.
Human freedom has both a negative and a positive conception. Human beings are
free in a negative sense insofar as no foreign causal forces dictate what she, as a rational
agent, ought to do. Human beings are free in a positive sense insofar as reason is free to give
itself laws of its own fabrication—free will as subject only to its own laws. Kant writes:
Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by 
sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The 
positive concept of freedom is that of the ability of pure reason to 
be of itself practical.41
Human beings, therefore, are accommodated with the ability to choose freely, which is 
distinguished from choice based on inclination. Whereas the former stems from the rational 
agent’s capacity to guide her own actions, hence affording human beings the ability to 
choose freely, the latter type of choice affords human beings with animalistic freedom,42 
which represents achieving ends and undergoing acts that are determined by inclination.
What separates autonomous agents from inautonomous agents in this regard is that 
the former acts independent of alien causation, whereas the latter has its action determined 
by biological and environmental forces, and is hence dependent in some way. Because
40 CPrR, pages 42-43.
41 MM, page 13.
42 See MM, page 13.
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human beings exhibit a dual nature, they act from both natures at least some of the time. The 
positive conception of freedom yields the conception of human beings as autonomous, as 
independently lawmaking beings. Because free will is conceived as being itself a lawmaker, 
the difference between it and a will that is subject to moral laws is blurred and eliminated; in 
fact, according to Kant, “a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same”.43 
‘The idea of morality, then, reduces to the idea of freedom’; we are driven to presuppose the 
concept of freedom in order to understand ourselves as initiating moral causation, and hence 
as conceiving all rational beings as (potentially) exhibiting such causation 44 In other words, 
the moral law is presupposed through the idea of human free will, itself (merely) necessarily 
a presupposition.
A worry arises, however, in that our high regard for the moral law surely cannot 
rest on presuppositions, in which case it would be ill founded and dogmatic. In other words, 
where does the moral law derive its force?45 The answer, according to Kant, again stems 
from the fact that human beings are both sensual and intelligible beings. Human beings have 
two perspectives from which to view themselves: first, insofar as they belong to the world of 
sense, they are subject to the laws of Nature; second, insofar as they belong to the 
intelligible world, under the subjection of the laws founded in reason alone.46 Because we 
can conceive of ourselves as free beings, we can only so conceive ourselves as such as 
members of the world of understanding, and hence the recognition of our autonomy follows 
necessarily, as does, consequently, our recognition of ourselves as moral agents. In fact, the 
pure practical law of morality only becomes possible because the conception of freedom 
compels human beings to recognize their membership in an intelligible realm. If this were 
the only ‘world’ in which the nature of human beings was founded, then all actions would
43 MM, page 88.
44 FPMM, page 80.
45 Ibid., page 82.
46 Ibid., pages 84-85.
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stem from rational volition, and hence would never fail to conform to that same will as
autonomous. That is not to say that immoral action would be eliminated in such a
hypothetical world. It is merely to say that the conflict between animality and rationality
would cease to exist; hence there would be less animal coercion away from following the
moral law, from acting from duty.
However, because the actions of human beings can stray from moral causation,
they do not always necessarily conform to the autonomy of the will. Because of this, in some
cases our actions must be guided and controlled by reason so as to avoid succumbing to the
desires and inclinations of our physical nature. ‘What human beings morally “ought” to do is
then what they necessarily “would” do as a member of the world of the understanding, and
is conceived by them as an “ought” only inasmuch as they likewise consider themselves
members of the world of sense’.47 Hence the categorical ought reveals itself as reason’s tool
for rational self-determination in the face of inclinational temptation. Kant writes:
Reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty with 
regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it 
to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an 
implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; 
and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical 
faculty, i.e. as one which is to have influence on the will, 
therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her 
capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination 
must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to 
something else, but good in itself, for which reason was 
absolutely necessary 48
This is Kant’s conception of freedom in a nutshell, and constitutes the second main 
tenet of his moral philosophy. The moral agent is presupposed by Kant to possess both 
rationality and freedom, although he does acknowledge that the strength and potency of 
either trait may vary across differing individual agents in practice. With a discussion of the 
two basic tenets of Kant’s moral thought in place, we are now well equipped to see how
47 FPMM, pages 87-88.
48 Ibid., pages 20-21.
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these two tenets come together to articulate the moral law in the form of the categorical 
imperative.
2.2 Three Formulations of the Categorical Imperative
As we have seen, morality, according to Kant, is possible only through rational agents’ 
conception of themselves as free and autonomous agents in the world. Moreover, this 
conception upholds a reciprocal relationship between itself and the agent’s natural ability to 
reason. The moral law is nothing other than human freedom giving laws to itself, through 
the agent’s exercise of reason.
With rationality and freedom as the two characteristic points of departure for 
morality, Kant proceeds to articulate the moral law through the conception of what he terms 
the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is not a tool that Kant uses in order to 
explain his views regarding what human agents ought to do. Nor is it a law found in the 
sensual world, merely tapped into by rational beings. Rather, the categorical imperative, in 
all of its formulations, stems from reason alone, and is a priori-, it is ever-present in 
humanity insofar as humanity is free and rational.
2.2.1 Subjective maxims
In order to assess whether an action is morally permissible or otherwise, an agent must test
her subjective maxim against the objective formal criteria of the categorical imperative. By a
maxim here is meant nothing other than a subjective rule or principle of action. Kant writes:
A maxim is subjective principle of action, and must be 
distinguished from the objective principle, namely, practical law 
[categorical imperative]. The former contains the practical rule set 
by reason according to conditions of the subject (often its 
ignorance or its inclination), so that it is the principle on which 
the subject acts-, but the law is the objective principle valid for 
every rational being, and is the principle on which it ought to act
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that is an imperative.49
Whereas a maxim is a self-formulated, self-directed principle of action, regardless
of whether it stems from reason or inclination, in order for it to become convertible into a
moral law, it must first pass the test of universalizability. In other words, it must be believed
of the specific maxim that all moral agents would adopt it as their own subjective principle.
Maxims are not concretely established in the sense that they themselves are universal per se.
Rather, maxims are subjective, which means that they vary across time, individuals and
cultures, but are to ‘become’ universal (if possible) through the thought experiment of
applying them to the categorical imperative. Kant writes:
A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law. A 
rule that the agent himself makes his principle on subjective 
grounds is called his maxim; hence different agents can have very 
different maxims with regard to the same law...
You must therefore first consider your actions in terms of 
their subjective principles; but you can know whether this 
principle also holds objectively only in this way: that when your 
reason subjects it to the test of conceiving yourself as also giving 
universal law through it, it qualifies for such a giving of universal 
law.50
It is only maxims that satisfy the criteria of morality (i.e. as being conducive of
objectification), as set forth by reason a priori, that can be morally acted upon.
Although it is often quite tempting to make one’s maxim the one and only
exception to the rule, Kant repeatedly stresses the immorality of doing so:
If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of 
duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim 
should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us; on the 
contrary we will that the opposite should remain a universal law, 
only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own 
favour (just for this time only), in favour of our inclination.
Consequently, if we considered all cases from one and the same 
point of view, namely, that of reason, we should find a 
contradiction in our own will, namely, that a certain principle 
should be objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet
49 FPMM, page 49f7.
50 MM, page 17.
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
subjectively should not be universal, but admit of exceptions.51 
Thus, the moral law prohibits exceptions, regardless of circumstances, status, 
accomplishments, desires, et cetera. Although such exceptional instances are not themselves 
failures of a maxim to be universalizable, they nevertheless represent moral reprehensibility, 
since the agent succumbs to inclination over reason (duty). Hence, when a subjective maxim
is found conducive of objectification, in the sense of being a possible universal law for all
rational beings, and where an agent nevertheless acts in violation of such a maxim (that is to 
say, does not act on the moral maxim), the agent acts immorally. In other words, an agent 
acts immorally when she acts upon a maxim that cannot be universalized or, what is the 
same, when she does not act on a maxim that is universalizable (discussed in the next 
section).
It is prudent in our current discussion to offer an elucidation of the suicidal maxim, 
which helps to clarify what a maxim is, and, for our later purposes, promotes a better 
understanding of why Kant argues that the suicidal maxim is not universalizable. As 
outlined in FPMM, the suicidal maxim is illustrated in two ways:
1. From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when 
its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.52
2. He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his 
action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in 
itself!53
For the purposes of this paper, the suicidal maxim is characterized as follows:
(SM): Can I will that ‘I ought to wilfully and intently end my 
own existence when enduring my present life circumstances no 
longer seems fit for the purposes of happiness (for example)’ to 
be a universal law of Nature?
As demonstrated later, and as Kant himself acknowledges, this marks only one 
type of suicidal maxim; maxims are by definition subjective, and hence context sensitive. In
51 FPMM, page 53.
52 FPMM, page 50.
53 Ibid., page 58.
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fact, Kant’s suicidal maxims outlined above exemplify maxims that exclude circumstantial 
details, whether the acting agent is rational or irrational, for example. Moreover, articulating 
a particular maxim can prove difficult (if not downright impossible) due to the large amount 
of underlying and relevant circumstantial considerations that need to be thought through in 
the process of maxim formation and assessment. For now, let it suffice to say that, in order 
to conclude whether a maxim of suicide is morally permissible or otherwise, it must first be 
articulated in its specificities, and then subjected to the various formulations of the 
categorical imperative indiscriminately.
2.2.2 The Categorical Imperative
Once an agent’s maxim has been conceived, it is not to be subjected to just any type of
imperative, but must be applied to the categorical imperative. Thus, Kant draws the
distinction between imperatives that are hypothetical and those that are categorical. Whereas
the former type refer to laws of possible actions merely as means to certain proposed or
desired ends (for example, to journey from New York City to Toronto I can travel by train,
or walk, or hitchhike, or teleport, or dig a series of underground tunnels, et cetera), the latter
represent objectively necessary actions, regardless of whether the end is actually achieved or
otherwise. In essence, categorical imperatives are only formulated for the sake of the end
itself. For example, ‘I ought to foster my talents because it is dutiful to do so’. Imperatives of
the categorical sort then represent a focus on the ends rather than on the means of attaining
such ends. Kant writes:
Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, 
and on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable 
by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulas determining an 
action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good 
in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to 
something else, then the imperative is hypothetical, if it is 
conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily 
the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
categorical.54
It is only by acting on the categorical imperative that one can be said to be acting
in the realm of moral imperatives, for it is only here that one does not merely act in
conformity with duty, but from duty. Such categorical determination is not contingent or
ever-changing, but rather objectively necessary, and represents itself as a valid apodictic law
of pure practical reason.55 The important point is that imperatives which dictate the means
for achieving happiness (for example) are not commanded absolutely. Kant writes:
Now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being 
may be called prudence, in the narrowest sense. And thus the 
imperative which refers to the choice of means to one’s own 
happiness, I.e., the precept of prudence, is still always 
hypothetical', the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as 
means to another purpose.56
In fact, such means necessarily change from one person to the next, from one context to the
next, since happiness as a concept is obscure and context-dependent. The imperatives of
prudence cannot be apodictic because there is no a priori method of attaining and securing
happiness; hence there exists no concrete or static act (or set of actions) that necessarily
yields happiness.
In the categorical imperative itself is contained the concept of one’s obligation to 
it; such a law involves the concept of unconditional necessity of action on behalf of the 
agent. It commands rather than counsels. Even in the face of animalistic (phenomenal) 
inclination or desire, the idea of such a law obligates one to follow its ruling. In direct 
contrast with counsels of happiness, the categorical imperative presents actions as practically 
necessary, a priori. This is not to say, however, that the distinction between hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives is obvious in human reality. In fact, there exists an inherent 
uncertainty of the driving spring behind any action, as potentially deceiving and contra-
54 FPMM, page 42.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., page 43.
29
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dutiful. There exists a real (and perhaps insurmountable) fear that all imperatives hitherto
acted upon were done so from motives as means to subsequent ends, rather than for the sake
of the end itself, and hence the fear that all imperatives acted upon have hitherto been
hypothetical rather than categorical. “In fact,” writes Kant, “it is absolutely impossible to
make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an
action, however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception of
duty...[We] can never get behind the secret springs of action”.57 Despite the difficulty in
distinguishing the two types of motives in real life, the distinction nevertheless holds and,
more importantly, it is only motives of the categorical type that are imputable to morality,
and hence conducive of moral action.
The difficulty of establishing the possibility of the categorical imperative,
according to Kant, rests on the fact that it is a synthetic a priori proposition. In FPMM, Kant
seeks to establish its possibility by examining the mere conception of such an imperative.58
By conceiving of a (possible) categorical imperative, its contents are revealed to be nothing
other than the concept of the law itself and the necessity of one’s action (or subjective
maxim) to be in conformity with that law as universally valid and applicable. The first
formulation of the categorical imperative runs as follows:
Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law [of Nature].59
All duties and moral obligation stem from this principle of volition. It is by testing one’s
subjective maxim with respect to this law that one can decipher whether it can be morally
acted upon.
As alluded to earlier (see page 20), if the nature of human beings were not
57 FPMM, page 34.
58 FPMM, page 48.
59 FPMM, page 49. It is important to note that, although some may be inclined to argue that a 
distinction ought to be made between the universal law and the law of Nature, a separation ultimately 
amounting to the creation o f two separate formulations o f the categorical imperative (derived from the
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twofold—this is to say, inclinational and rational—then perhaps there would be no non- 
rational obstructions to veil what one ought to do. However, this can be equally viewed from 
the opposite perspective: if all actions were dictated by instinct alone (this is to say, if the 
nature of human beings were only phenomenal) then all actions would be determined and 
the notion of autonomy (and morality along with it) superfluous. However, since the nature 
of human kind is such that its members possess both noumenal and phenomenal 
characteristics, it is the burden of the agent to decide which force is to take precedence in 
any given situation. Furthermore, it is from this dual nature that the categorical imperative, 
in the form of a moral law of pure practical reason, is even possible in the first place.
By rationally conceiving herself as a free agent, the agent places herself in the 
intelligible world, amidst all other rational entities. All actions in this realm pertain to her 
autonomy and, if she were nothing other than an intelligible being, all of her actions would 
henceforth conform to this autonomy. But, she simultaneously conceives herself as bound by 
certain desires and inclinations, and hence, simultaneously as part of an unintelligible world. 
All of her free actions, therefore, do not of themselves necessarily affirm her noumenal 
character, although they nevertheless ought to. This “ought,” as demanded by the moral law, 
is affirmed for all rational entities as such, and hence what one ought to do is also what all 
rational agents ought to do as well.
The second formulation of the categorical imperative emphasizes the treatment of 
rational beings with respect and dignity, qua rational and dignified beings. Kant articulates it 
as follows:
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that 
of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means 
only.60
This notion of the worth of rational beings as intrinsic and deserving of respect is itself
one outlined above), given their similarity, I treat them as one formulation.
60 FPMM, page 58.
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
intrinsic, or known a priori. Hence it is not merely a subjective maxim of person r to treat
humanity as an end; rather, this law represents a supremely limiting range on subjective
maxims of action, for all rational beings as such. By urging the agent to treat others as ends
in themselves, the moral law is in essence demanding that one interact with and employ
others not merely on the basis of their utility, but to recognize them as above all else
deserving of respect as an equally free and rational agent as oneself. Situations where one
agent is taken advantage of by another, for the sake of money for example, constitute
violations of this formulation of the categorical imperative. Although one may accept money
from other people who are willing to lend, acceptance of such gratuity is not permitted at the
expense of the lender’s dignity as a rational and free agent in the world.
The third formulation of the categorical imperative emphasizes the human will as
lawgiving as well as law abiding. In a sense, this formulation most emphasizes the idea of
rational agents as both negatively and positively free entities. It runs as follows:
Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is 
the ultimate condition of its harmony with the universal practical 
reason, viz.: the idea of the will of every rational being as a 
universally legislating will.61
Through her ability to reason, the agent is both creator and abider of the moral law. In fact,
‘the agent is so subject to the law that she must regard herself as its dictator, which marks
the reason why she is bound by it in the first place’.
The culmination of the three formulations of the pure practical law of morality
outlined above is represented in Kant’s idea of an ideal Kingdom o f Ends. The conception of
a possible world where all one’s subjective maxims, and all those subjective maxims of all
other rational agents, coincide with the pure law of morality is nothing other than the
conception of a harmonious community, a kingdom where all agents have achieved the
61 FPMM, page 60.
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highest good of virtue coupled with happiness.62 In this striven-for ideal world, all citizens
have achieved an absolutely good will. It is here that the moral law is established and
followed as a “system of common laws,” analogous to a system of Nature. Kant describes
the Kingdom of Ends as follows:
[All] rational beings come under the law that each of them must 
treat itself and all others never merely as means, but in every case 
at the same time as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic 
union of rational beings by common objective laws, i.e., a 
kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what 
these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one 
another as ends and means. It is certainly only an ideal.63
This hypothetical society marks the highest individual and collective moral achievement a
society populated with rational agents can reach. It represents each individual respecting the
laws of morality as set forth by their capacities as both rational and autonomous.
To gain access to the moral law, it is helpful to apply the given maxim under
review to all the varying formulations of the categorical imperative, hence offering different
moral perspectives on the situation at hand. In fact, Kant himself argues that all the various
formulations of the categorical imperative in the end amount to one moral law.
The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have 
been adduced are at bottom only so many formulas of the very 
same law, and each of itself involves the other two. There is, 
however, a difference in them, but it is rather subjectively than 
objectively practical, intended namely to bring an idea of the 
reason nearer to intuition.. .and thereby nearer to feeling.64
According to John Rawls in his Lectures on the History o f Moral Philosophy,
‘Kant’s point is that the three formulations of the categorical imperative are more effective
than any one by itself in bringing that law as an idea of reason nearer to intuition’. This idea
brings Rawls to suggest a categorical imperative-procedure (or ci-procedure), one which the
62 In CPrR, Kant writes that “In the highest good which is practical for us, that is, to be made through 
our will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed 
by pure practical reason without the other also belonging to it” (page 95).
63 FPMM, page 62.
64 FPMM, page 65.
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agent must follow in order to determine the moral validity of her maxim. The agent is to
begin with her subjective maxim in mind, a principle supposed to be valid for her. Once this
maxim has been adequately formulated, the agent is then required to attempt to generalize
her subjective maxim, in effect applying it to all three formulations of the moral law
consecutively. The final step in the procedure is to ‘transform’ the newly generalized maxim
into a law of Nature (if possible), “as if such a law was implanted in us by natural instinct”.65
About this final step, Rawls writes:
We are to adjourn the as-if law of nature at step (3) to the existing 
laws of nature (as these are understood by us) and then think 
through as best we can what the order of nature would be once the 
effects of the newly adjoined law of nature have had sufficient 
time to work themselves out.66
Two important implications of Kant’s doctrine, often overlooked or 
underemphasized, are highlighted by Rawls in the above passage. First, the idea that there is 
a temporal aspect involved in the deliberation process of whether or not a maxim could be a 
sound universal law. The agent must project her maxim out into the real world of which she 
finds herself part of, which is at the same time a projection into the future of that same 
world. Knowledge of the future consequences of establishing her maxim as a moral law 
make up a part of what is required for accurate assessment of whether her subjective maxim 
can be objectified, whether now or anytime in the future. Although this general foresight is 
crucial in order to determine indubitably whether a maxim can be universalized or 
otherwise, the worry arises that such foresight is inevitably limited, and hence all verdicts 
regarding the universalizability of a given maxim remain to an extent speculative and 
fallible.
As Hans Jonas pointed out in his “Technology and Responsibility,” traditional 
ethical views (of which Kant’s moral philosophy is for Jonas a paradigm example) fail to
65 Rawls (2000), page 168.
66 Rawls (2000), page 169.
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account for broad temporal and spatial consequences of actions, and hence restrict an agent’s 
responsibility to the here-and-now. According to Jonas, “the good and evil about which 
action had to care lay close to the act, either in the praxis itself or in its immediate reach, and 
were not a matter of remote planning”.67 Jonas’ point is that sound maxim formulation and 
assessment must take into account the possible future consequences of the given act if such a 
maxim were to become universally applied, rather than merely the effects that are obvious at 
first glance. This point will emerge again later with respect to suicidal maxims in particular. 
It seems that, at best, the categorical imperative may only be a loose guiding principle, a 
thought experiment of sorts, since the acting agent at hand is obligated to (or assumed to) 
have an impossible amount of information in her possession, most notably an acute rational 
capacity and an ability to ‘predict’ the consequences of universalizing her maxim in a world 
saturated with uncertainty. Even if the agent may call upon her faculty of judgement, in 
unison with her rational and moral tendencies, in order to better assess her maxims, perhaps 
even leam from her mistakes, et cetera, the worry is that certain mistakes are drastically 
irreversible (such as, say, the nuclear destruction of the world, or committing suicide). Since 
this is the case, ethics needs to offer guidance to human activity so that such mistakes are 
avoided in the first place, such guidance being something Kant’s ethical theory may not be 
able to offer.
The second point brought up by Rawls is with respect to the context sensitivity of 
the moral procedure. What effects come about depend largely on the state of the world, 
which in turn depends largely on how the acting agent perceives the world, and how the 
world actually is. “The ci-procedure applies,” Rawls writes, “to maxims that lucid and 
rational agents have arrived at in view of what they regard as the relevant features of their 
circumstances”.68 Is this to say that two identical (yet subjective) maxims, tested by two
67 See Jonas’ “Technology and Responsibility” in Kaplan (2004).
68 Rawls (2000), page 168.
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separate individual agents, could possibly end in the same maxim maintaining differing 
moral verdicts? The answer is both “yes” and “no”.
The answer is “yes” in the sense that, since the two agents’ differing circumstances
may lead them to different conclusions regarding the identical maxim under scrutiny, the
maxim can be thought universalizable by one agent and not the other. This being said, if the
two agents come to different moral verdicts (i.e. one believes the maxim to be
universalizable while the other maintains its non-universalizability), then one of them is
necessarily mistaken (according to Kant). The reason the answer to our above question is
“no” is that there can only be one true answer regarding the morality of each subjective
maxim, regardless of whether the agent (or both agents in unison) actually reaches the
proper verdict. The idea is that, through proper exercise of reason and knowledge of the
moral law, the agent will ideally come to the proper conclusion. In fact, just by going
through the proper motions of the ci-procedure, the agent is presupposed by Kant (and
Rawls) to be seeking the correct moral verdict in the first place. Rawls writes:
What led us to check our maxim by the categorical imperative 
procedure [in the first place]...was not our inclinations but our 
moral sensibility and the practical interest we take in the moral 
law. Without this...we would not bother to check....whether we 
could incorporate that inclination into a permissible maxim.69
Although different agents can come to different moral conclusions for their given maxims, it
is Kant’s view that they ought not to. Or, put somewhat differently, the agent can only be
correct if her verdict truly reflects the dictation of the moral law.
2.3 Duty and a Good Will
So far it has been shown that, according to Kant, in order for an agent to be moral she must 
be rational and free, so as to be able to act in accordance with the pure practical law of 
morality. In a sense, rational and autonomous activity in accordance with the categorical
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imperative marks the path to attaining the goal of establishing a moral character. A different 
way of understanding Kantian moral thought is to view the agent as required to act dutifully 
for the sake of duty.
According to Kant, nothing (whether real or merely conceivable) is unqualifiedly
good except for a good will.70 It is the goodness of a will that ensures the proper control in
the use of other so-called goods (for example riches, political influence, et cetera), so as to
ensure that their use and application in concrete situations are not corrupted or misguided.
Hence, ‘without the principles of a good will, exerting self-control (for example) may
become extremely bad,’ as when “the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more
dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have
been without it”.71 According to Kant, a good will is good in itself. It is not good because it
makes its possessor perfect, or nice, or happy (which is to say good as a means to some other
proposed end), but rather it is good for its own sake. Kant writes:
Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of 
fortune, or the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this 
will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with 
its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should 
remain only the good will...then, like a jewel, it would still shine 
by its own light, as a thing which has its own value in itself.72
A good will then is not to be measured on the basis of utility, but rather as an end in itself. In
fact, the reason that rational beings possess a rational capacity is not for the attainment or
contemplation of happiness, but rather for the cultivation of a will towards its becoming a
good will, achievable only by acting in accord with one’s duty. By acting from duty, and
hence in accordance with the practical law of morality, and by applying one’s subjective
maxims to the test of morality, one seeks to achieve the establishment of a good will. It is
only through such an achievement that rational agents may become worthy of happiness in
® Rawls (2000), page 178.
70 FPMM, page 17.
71 FPMM, page 18.
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the first place. As a good will is achieved for human beings only through dutiful action, an 
elucidation of what is meant by “duty” is in order.
Kant defines duty as “that action to which someone is bound. It is therefore a 
matter of obligation, and there can be one and the same duty (as to an action) although we 
can be bound to it in different ways”.73 Kant distinguishes between duties that are perfect (or 
narrow) and those that are imperfect (or wide), as well as those that concern actions directed 
towards others as opposed to being directed towards oneself. By a duty that is perfect, Kant 
is referring to a duty that is narrow, straightforward (with regards to specific actions to be 
taken or avoided), and without exception. The strictness of perfect duties entails a temporal 
consistency, which is to say that a perfect duty is done all the time, for example as when an 
agent continuously chooses to act so as to not commit suicide.
Perfect duties are contrasted with imperfect duties, which are duties specified by 
general guidelines of action, without specific terms, and are increasingly context-specific 
relative to perfect duties. It is not that such duties afford of exceptions; no duty (in the strict 
sense of the term) affords of exception. Rather, a duty that is imperfect is one which may be 
achieved through several means, each equally aiding in the accomplishment of the dutiful 
end under question, and each meeting the requirement of acting from duty, rather than 
merely in conformity with duty. The inexactness or looseness of imperfect duties entails that 
such duties are less temporally demanding than perfect duties are; they need to be done in 
order to uphold morality, yet not on a constant basis. Giving to the poor, for example, marks 
a wide duty to others and ought to be done, but cannot be expected of an agent who herself 
is in need of comparable charity. In a sense, we can view perfect duties as having both their 
form and substance dictated by the law of morality, while imperfect duties suggest merely a 
form, to which the agent may apply a myriad of different substantive contents.
72 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
73 MM, page 15.
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An example of the former type of duty, Kant argues, is self-preservation. 
Maintaining one’s life (or not committing suicide) is the supreme perfect duty to oneself. 
Suicide, according to Kant, does not admit to any exceptions (except, as will be shown later, 
in the highly unusual case of heroic suicide), is not a matter of degree (i.e. one cannot, 
strictly speaking, partially kill oneself or commit suicide today and be alive to not commit 
suicide tomorrow), and is morally forbidden. Aiding others in pursuing their own self- 
perfection and fostering ones own talents are both examples of duties of the imperfect 
orientation. Fostering ones’ natural talents could mean any number of things: spending all of 
ones free time playing the electric guitar, working steadily so that one develops into the most 
influential poet in the universe, educating oneself in matters of the law, improving one’s 
woodworking skills, and so on. In a rough sense, wide or imperfect duties can be a matter of 
subjective interpretation and degree, while perfect duties are strict and immovable, 
irrespective of subjective variables.
Not only is self-preservation a perfect duty, but it is also a duty to oneself. Duties 
towards oneself are just that: duties that are directed toward no one other than oneself. The 
agent in question has a duty toward herself in matters of self-preservation, treating oneself 
with respect (respecting humanity within herself), and acting towards self-perfection. 
Conversely, duties towards others are just what their name implies: duties that involve one’s 
actions towards others. Such duties include benevolence and truthfulness.
In FPMM, Kant makes three important claims about duty with respect to moral 
action. The first is that for an action to be moral, it must be done from duty rather than from 
motives of desire or inclination, or merely in conformity with what duty prescribes. As 
mentioned above, it is difficult (if not utterly impossible) to know without a doubt whether 
an agent is acting from duty or otherwise. Nevertheless, in order for one’s action to meet the 
requirements of morality, one’s action must both conform to and stem from duty. The 
second claim is that the moral worth of an action as done from duty is found not in the end
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sought but in the act itself (or in the acting agent’s principle of volition). Kant’s point with 
regards to the second principle of duty is not whether the agent focuses on the means or 
focuses on the ends of an action (for, in order for an action to be moral, the agent must 
undoubtedly consider the dutiful end rather than the means), but rather that whether or not 
the goal of the action is in fact achieved is irrelevant to the act being a moral one. 
Unconditional moral worth is found in doing one’s duty, not for reason of the actual effects, 
but rather from the principle of the will itself.
Thirdly, for Kant duty is the necessity of acting in such a way so as to exhibit 
respect for the moral law as such. In other words, an action that is performed from duty arid 
hence which excludes considerations of desire is determined by the objective law, and is 
hence respected by the moral subject through her adherence to this law. The agent’s will is 
hence determined twofold: by the objective law as necessary and by the pure respect the law 
deserves, upheld through her dutiful action.
2.4 Failed Subjective Principles
Kant argues that a subjective maxim can fail to meet the requirements of being a possible
universal practical law in (at least) two ways. In her Constructions o f Reason: Explorations
in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Onora O’Neill terms these failures conceptual inconsistency
and volitional inconsistency. Kant writes:
We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a 
universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the 
action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their 
maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a 
universal law of nature, far from being able possible that we 
should will that it should be so. In others this intrinsic 
impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to will that 
their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of 
nature, since such a will would contradict itself.74
Cases where a maxim signifies a contradiction in conception are cases where the maxim
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cannot be consistently conceived in itself as a universal law; in effect it is conceptually
impossible to actualize in reality. If what the maxim demands from reality (or what
constraints it puts on the physical world) is impossible in concreto, then that maxim itself is
conceptually impossible. For example, the maxim that one ought to become a slave owner is
inconceivable as a universal precept since to will such a maxim as universal overlooks the
idea that for there to exist slave-owners there must exist slaves; but if all rational beings
were slaveowners, then no (rational) human being would be left over to populate the slave
category. To say that all agents ought to ‘own’ slaves is conceptually impossible since one
half of the dichotomous relationship is necessarily sacrificed in its entirety. O’Neill
formulates this test of one’s maxims as follows:
A maxim of action may in the first place be incoherent simply 
because it expresses an impossible aspiration.. .Agents whose 
underlying maxims incorporate such conceptual inconsistencies 
do not, of course, succeed in performing impossible acts; rather, 
the pattern of their actions appears to pull in opposite directions 
and to be in various ways self-defeating.75
Maxims that signify a contradiction of volition result when a maxim cannot be 
consistently willed by the agent, often playing on the idea of differing interests or volitions. 
Here the individual willing agent contradicts herself, failing to will simultaneously the 
necessary means to the prescribed end and the end to be attained. In other words, the agent 
vicariously adopts a maxim in which she excludes herself from being accountable. It is as if 
she imagines herself as being an exception to the rule to which all other rational agents are 
bound, or simultaneously wills two maxims that ultimately contradict each other.76 O’Neill
74 FPMM, page 52.
75 O’Neill (1989), pages 89-90. Although not ultimately crucial for a clear understanding o f Kant’s 
idea o f inconsistent maxims, Onora O’Neill distinguishes between inconsistencies without 
universalizing and inconsistencies in universalizing maxims. Although their respective labels are 
more or less self-explanatory, see Chapter Five in O ’Neill’s Constructions of Reason for her 
discussion o f the topic.
76 Kant puts the idea quite nicely in FPMM: “If now we attend to ourselves on occasion o f any 
transgression o f duty, we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal 
law, for that is impossible for us; on the contrary we will that the opposite should be a universal law, 
only we
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writes:
This amounts to saying that to will some end without willing 
whatever means are indispensable for that end, insofar as they are 
available, is, even when the end itself involves no conceptual 
inconsistency, to involve oneself in a volitional inconsistency. It 
is to embrace at least one specific intention that, far from being 
guided by the underlying intention or principle, is inconsistent 
with that intention or principle.77
An example of this type of contradiction is to will that slavery ought to be abolished from
the world, yet to simultaneously act so as to preserve a State where slavery exists (by, for
example, voting for a political party that condones slavery, or, during the time of the
Underground Railroad, providing the authorities of the day with information that would
threaten its continued existence). In such cases a volitional conflict exists since one cannot
realistically will the end of non-slavery while simultaneously willing the means that are
conducive to upholding slavery.
In his Lectures on the History o f Moral Philosophy, John Rawls gives a useful
discussion regarding the ways a maxim can fail to pass the moral imperative test, one that is
complimentary to O’Neill’s characterization. According to Rawls, in order for a subjective
maxim to be found morally permissible it must satisfy two conditions: acting on the maxim
must be possible on behalf of the agent as rational and free; and, secondly, the maxim must
not be self-contradictory. In other words, the agent must be able to act from such a maxim,
i.e. ‘the agent must exhibit the possibility of intention towards acting on the maxim when
she regards herself as a member of the ‘re-organized’ social world that includes this new
law, and must conceive herself as such that she is acting in that world and is henceforth
subject to its conditions’.78 Moreover, she must also be able to will such a newly revised
social reality, “she must be able to will this adjusted social world itself and affirm it as if she
assume the liberty o f making an exception in our own favour o f (just for this time only) in favour o f  
our inclination” (page 52).
77 O’Neill (1989), page 91.
78 Rawls (2000), page 169.
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were already a member belonging to it”.79
This chapter has been devoted to explicating Kant’s moral philosophy in general. 
It was shown that his ethical thought is based on the two major themes of rational and 
autonomous agency, which in turn are closely linked with the categorical imperative (as the 
pure practical law of morality articulated), achieving a good will through acting according to 
duty, and the testing of subjective maxims so as to ensure their universalizability and 
consistency. In the next chapter, our understanding of Kant’s general moral thought is 
applied specifically to the moral standing of suicide.
79 Rawls (2000), page 169.
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III. Kant’s Suicidology
Now that we have a picture of Kant’s general moral theory in place, we are well positioned 
to examine his views regarding the moral standing of suicide specifically. I do so in the 
present chapter by discussing his views regarding suicide found in LE, FPMM, and MM. 
Although each work is quite limited in its discussion regarding the moral standing of 
suicide, taken in unison these three works offer a more or less complete picture of Kant’s 
overall suicidology.
Throughout my exposition of Kant’s ethic of suicide, some suggestions are offered 
as to where Kant’s views may be criticized. Nevertheless, these considerations remain 
somewhat secondary to my main purposes. It is what Kant does not account for in his 
analysis of the moral standing of suicide that will mark the main target of my later critique. 
The indication being that his non-inclusiveness of crucial ideas negatively affects his overall 
ethic of suicide. My present task, however, is merely to articulate Kant’s suicidology 
accurately, so as to be well positioned to suggest possible welcome additions to it in the next 
chapter.
3.1 The Immorality of Suicide According to Kant
I begin my discussion of Kant’s views regarding the moral standing of suicide with an 
examination of LE. I do so, however, keeping three cautions in mind. First, LE is largely an 
exposition of Alexander Gottleib Baumgarten’s ethical view, itself an influential theory 
during Kant’s time, and hence what may appear to be Kant’s views may not always be so.80 
Secondly, LE is made up of notes taken by Kant’s students at the time, and may not entirely 
or consistently state Kant’s views. In other words, through interpretation, as well as
80 In his introduction to Kant’s LE, J.B. Schneewind suggests that “[Kant’s] textbooks in ethics 
were.. .always or almost always the same: two works by Alexander Gottleib Baumgartner (1714-62),”
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translation, some of the original meaning may have been sacrificed. Lastly, we must keep in 
mind that LE represents some of Kant’s earliest work in moral theory, and his views grew 
and developed over time. At best we can hope to compare what Kant says here with what he 
wrote elsewhere, gaining a more thorough understanding of his overall views. Having said 
this, LE nevertheless provides a rich source of information regarding Kant’s suicidology.
In LE, as in his later writing, Kant argues that suicide is the paramount 
infringement of duties towards oneself.81 However, there are different types of suicidal 
cases, where the morally restricted must be distinguished from the morally permissible; 
some cases of suicide, according to Kant, do not constitute moral violations (in the strict 
sense). This is important to keep in mind since, when we ask ourselves what constitutes a 
case of suicide that is morally reprehensible versus one that is not, a direct analysis of Kant’s 
distinction may prove fruitful for drawing practical conclusions.
One type of suicide, according to Kant, is the suicide that is blameworthy. In such 
cases, the suicide is morally prohibited since the suicide victim renounces her moral worth, 
respect, humanity, freedom, and autonomy. An exposition of the reasons why such instances 
of suicide are morally impermissible is provided later. Prima facie, this type of suicide 
seems to be the predominant historical conception of suicide, and exemplifies the 
foundational ideology that fuels the widespread belief that suicide is to be considered 
immoral, sacrilegious, inhumane, or otherwise problematic.
A second type of suicidal case is the heroic. This type marks the only version of 
suicide proper that Kant deems as morally permissible (as in allowable). Kant argues that, 
when faced with conflicting duties, it is sometimes morally permissible, nay, morally 
obligatory, to choose to end one’s life in order to uphold more strict or elevated moral
and it “helps in reading Kant’s lectures on ethics to know a little about Baumgarten’s moral 
philosophy and about the textbooks in which he expounded it” (xix).
1 Interestingly enough, despite holding suicide as abhorrent, impermissible, horrific, et cetera, Kant 
reveals somewhat how un-enlightened the Enlightenment was when he writes: “suicide is not as
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dictums. Heroic suicide does not represent a supererogatory act on behalf of the agent, but
rather one that duty demands. Kant writes:
It is better to sacrifice life than to forfeit morality.82
Furthermore, Kant continues:
The preservation of life is not the highest duty; one often has to 
give up life merely to have lived in an honourable way.83
Already we can see that Kant makes a distinction between specific cases of
suicide. In other words, he thinks that the motives and circumstances surrounding a suicidal
act are relevant in determining whether such an act is morally reprehensible or otherwise.
Kant continues this line of thought with respect to the intricacies of caring for one’s life:
[If] certain persons, in all innocence, were to be accused of 
treason, though among them there were really a few men of 
honour, along with others of the baser sort, having no inner 
worth, and if these people were together condemned to die, or to 
undergo a life-sentence of penal servitude, and each had to 
choose which of these punishments he preferred, it is perfectly 
certain that the honourable ones would choose death, and the 
worthless ones the penal servitude. The man of inner worth is 
not afraid of death, and would sooner die than be an object of 
contempt and live among felons in servitude. But the worthless 
man prefers servitude, almost as if it were already the proper 
thing for him. There are duties, therefore, to which life must be 
inferior, and in order to fulfill them we must evince no 
cowardice in regard to our life. The cowardice of man 
dishonours humanity, and it is very cowardly to set too much 
store by physical life. The man who on every trifling occasion is 
exceedingly fearful of his life, strikes everyone as very 
ridiculous. We must await our death with resolution. There is 
little worth in that which there is great worth in treating with 
disdain.84
It is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions regarding whether Kant can simultaneously 
assert (i) that life must be treasured (i.e. that self-preservation is a strict duty to oneself,
ignoble and base as masturbation [and] homosexuality...” (LE, page 161). 
“  LE, page 149.
83 Ibid., page 151.
84 LE, page 150.
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albeit an animalistic one85), and (ii) that life is sacred only insofar as one continues to be
able to live morally (i.e. that certain cases of suicide are morally permissible, where the
motive is to uphold morality). At first glance, in order to be consistent, it seems as though
Kant cannot include heroic suicide (or any other ‘permissible’ types of suicide) as being
morally sound, regardless of the situation in which it takes place. This is not to say that one
cannot simultaneously sanction the moral impermissibility of suicide while holding that
there may be exceptions to the rule. Rather, it is only because of Kant’s cherished
foundations of morality, namely, reason and freedom, that such an inconsistency arises in
the first place; in the case of heroic suicide, the so-called exception to the rule may not be a
genuine exception at all, for, it is not clear that heroic suicide does not violate freedom or
rationality. However, although it is one of the worst case scenarios confronted by rational
agents—being in a situation of forced choice between continuing to live and sacrificing her
moral character—nothing takes precedence over the maintenance of her moral character:
It is a very subtle question, how far we ought to treasure our life, 
and how far to risk it. The main point is this: Humanity, in our 
person, is an object of the highest respect and never to be violated 
in us. In the cases where a man is liable to dishonour, he is duty 
bound to give up his life, rather than dishonour the humanity in 
his own person.86
The process of deliberation in such cases presents a double-edged sword, yet the choice that 
ought to be pursued is nevertheless clear: commit suicide to maintain morality.
Kant argues that such situations of permissible suicide are rare, and certainly must 
be appropriately qualified so as to avoid moral reprehension. “One must certainly admit of 
this example,” writes Kant, “that in such a case, where suicide is a virtue, there seems to be
85 In MM, Kant writes: “There will be a subjective division o f a human being’s duties to himself, that 
is, one in terms o f whether the subject o f duty (the human being) views himself both as an animal 
(natural) and a moral being or only as a moral being. There are impulses o f  nature having to do with 
man’s animality. Through them nature aims at (a) his self-preservation, (b) the preservation o f the 
species, and (c) the preservation o f his capacity to enjoy life, though still on the animal level only. 
The vices that are here opposed to his duty to himself are murdering himself, the unnatural use o f  his 
sexual inclination, and.. .excessive consumption o f food and drink as weakens his capacity for making 
purposive use o f  his powers (page 175).
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much to be said for it. It is also the one example that has given the world an opportunity at
defending suicide. Yet it is also but one example of its kind”.87 Just because heroic suicide is
obligatory does not make it ideal, or suggest that other types of suicide ought to be
condoned. Perhaps labelling heroic suicide morally permissible is misleading, despite Kant
himself using similar language.88 It may be more appropriate to regard such instances from
the point of view that one must uphold morality to the extent p o ss ib le  in the given situation.
Where the context demands a choice between suicide and violating a higher law, then
suicide is demanded by the pure practical law of reason, rather than violating the higher
moral obligation. Perhaps such cases then are more aptly labelled obliga tory  suicide, rather
than heroic. For now, suffice it to say that some instances of suicide are less m orally
reprehensible  than others (according to Kant).
Lastly, Kant suggests that some cases of suicide are in fact perm issib le . This type
of ‘suicide’ plays on the definition of suicide proper. The permissible cases, argues Kant, are
those cases where the intent was not there to end one’s existence in the first place. An
example of this type of “suicide” would be an accidental self-death, or ignorance leading to
death, where the agent ends her own life out of misfortune or neglect. For example,
accidentally injecting a deadly amount of heroine into one’s veins, despite the intent merely
to experience an escapist euphoric sensation, represents a case of permissible suicide. To be
sure, Kant distinguishes between true  suicide (either blameworthy or heroic) and permissible
suicide (perhaps more aptly characterized as unintentional self-killing)'. “It is the intention to
destroy oneself that constitutes suicide”.89 Kant writes:
He who shortens his life by intemperance, is certainly to blame 
for his lack of foresight, and his death can thus be imputed, 
indirectly, to himself; but not directly, for he did not intend to kill 
himself. It was not a deliberate death. For all our offences are
86 LE, page 150.
87 LE, page 145.
88 Ibid., pages 144-146.
89 LE, page 146.
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either culpa [due to fault] or dolus [done with intent]. Now 
although there is no dolus here, there is certainly culpa. To such a 
one it can be said: You are yourself to blame for your death, but 
not: You are a suicide.90
Without the intention to kill oneself, such a ‘suicide’ becomes morally neutral; it is merely a
tragic and unfortunate accidental death, rather than a suicide. If nothing else, intuition leads
us to conclude that accidental death, even at the hands of oneself, does not constitute
suicide.91
According to Kant, then, some cases of suicide are in fact better characterized as 
pseudo-suicides, rather than suicides properly speaking. Moreover, Kant includes a 
consideration of select cases where suicide is in fact morally obligatory. Such cases depend 
to a large extent on the context in which the maxim is applied, and, more importantly, 
whether other (higher) moral obligations are protected from violation in the process. Putting 
these two types of suicide aside, what I am interested in for the most part is why cases of 
blameworthy suicide are considered by Kant to be violations of one’s moral duty. I will now 
examine the arguments he provides in LE, FPMM, and MM.
3.2 Blameworthy Suicide in Kant’s Lectures on Ethics
Kant gives several arguments for the impermissibility of blameworthy suicide in LE, which I 
separate into two broad categories. Suicide may be found morally impermissible for reasons 
of self-love or for going against human freedom. Due to the similarities across Kant’s 
arguments against the moral permissibility of suicide in the three texts examined herein, this 
classificatory scheme can be applied throughout our discussion. Although Kant offers
90 Ibid.
91 In his Ethics o f  Suicide, Victor Cosculluela offers an example that may help to drive this point 
home: “While cleaning a loaded riffle, A1 accidentally pulls the trigger, thereby killing him self’ (page 
134). Cosculluela suggests that A1 may have even been cleaning his gun in preparation for using it to 
commit suicide. However, because squeezing the trigger at that moment was accidental, despite his 
general intent to kill himself, A1 did not commit suicide, but rather accidentally ended his own life. 
Cosculluela rightly argues that, to say that suicide is merely any act o f  self-killing, is to give too wide 
of an account o f  suicide, which includes cases like the former.
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arguments against suicide other than these (for example, his arguments from religious 
considerations), they represent the two most repeated arguments against suicide throughout 
his writing.
3.2.1 Self-murder from Self-love
Kant repeatedly argues that suicide is morally impermissible when the motives behind it are
inclinational rather than dutiful, animal rather than rational, phenomenal rather than
noumenal. The arguments against suicide from self-love draw on the idea that actions are
only moral insofar as they are acted on through a sense of duty in the agent as rational and
autonomous, rather than sensuous motives. For instance, Kant writes:
By the rule of prudence there might be cases where to escape 
from all one’s troubles one may kill oneself; but it is contrary to 
morality, for the intention is, by sacrificing one’s condition, to 
abandon at a stroke all the pains and hardships of life; but in so 
doing, humanity is subordinated to animal nature, and my 
understanding is under the sway of animal impulse; and if so, I 
contradict myself when I demand to have rights of humanity.92
Elsewhere Kant continues:
So suicide evokes horror, in that man thereby puts himself below 
the beasts. We regard a suicide as a carcase, whereas we feel pity
for the one who meets his end through fate.93
Not only does Kant condemn the agent who commits suicide from self-love, he is shown
here also as condemning the blameworthy suicide as no longer deserving of noumenal
considerations. In the case of self-love, the motive is not one of consideration for one’s duty
as a rational agent, but rather from the avoidance of pain, the securing of happiness, the
satisfaction of desire. In fact, when such a maxim is acted upon, it violates the categorical
imperative in that it debases humanity in oneself and finds the agent succumbing to means
of securing contingent ends; the agent negates her noumenal nature by acting from
92 LE, pages. 70-71.
93 LE, page 146.
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phenomenal motives.
Specifically, such an egoistic maxim represents a contradiction of volition: the 
very definition of self-love entails that one needs to continue to live in order to ensure and 
increase it; in this case, the means of loving oneself are not willed along with the end of self- 
love. An agent cannot both will to be happy and simultaneously act so as to bring about the 
end of being able to be happy in the first place. The agent here is not considering herself as 
an end, but rather is only considering the avoidance of suffering—her self-termination as a 
means for achieving that end. When it seems that misery lies ahead, so much so that death 
becomes more appealing than to persevere in life, one must nevertheless refrain from 
committing suicide. This is because happiness (for example) is a ‘beastly’ motive, not a 
moral one:
By the rule of prudence, it would often be the best course, to 
remove oneself from the scene; but by the rule of morality it is 
not allowed under any condition, because it is the destruction of 
humanity, in that mankind is set lower than the beasts.94
By sacrificing her life for base and animalistic reasons, the agent renounces her rights as
being worthy of respect. Committing suicide from such motives is to demand that one be
treated as an animal rather than as a human being, since the agent is seeking animal ends
rather than dutiful ones. This maxim cannot be willed to be universal since it violates the
imperative claim that all rational beings be treated with respect, as the rational and
autonomous beings that they are, rather than being treated as non-rational entities.
3.2.2 Moral Agents as Un-free to Eliminate Freedom
Along with his arguments against suicide motivated from self-love, Kant provides several 
arguments that suggest suicide to be a violation of duty because it compromises and 
contradicts human freedom. Kant writes:
94 LE, page 147.
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So far.. .as anyone destroys his body, and thereby takes his own 
life, he has employed his choice to destroy the power of choosing 
itself, but in that case, free choice is in conflict with itself. The 
agent is using his life to put an end to his life”.95
Elsewhere, Kant continues:
Suicide is contrary to the supreme self-regarding duty, for the 
condition of all other duties is thereby abolished. It transcends all 
the limits on the use of free choice, for the latter is only possible 
insofar as the subject exists.96
The argument presented here is that freedom, as a component of human noumenal nature
and a condition for morality, cannot be used against itself; freedom cannot contradict
freedom. “If freedom is the condition of life,” writes Kant, “it cannot be employed to abolish
life, since then it destroys and abolishes itself’.97
What does Kant mean to say when he writes, “freedom is the condition of life”?
Presumably, he is implying something like the following: because human beings are free by
their very nature as rational agents in the world, which directly entails personal freedom
from outward determination (manifested in their ability to choose based on rational thought),
it is for that same reason a necessary condition of their life as rational, independent, and
wilful entities. Freedom is one of the characteristics that set human beings apart from the
rest of the phenomenal world, both in itself, and through its relation with rationality. In a
sense, to use freedom to end the existence of freedom in oneself eliminates the separation of
human beings from non-human entities (something that came up in Kant’s opposition to
suicide from self-love also), which it served to establish in the first place. As free and
rational agents, human beings have an obligation to remain so. Therefore, they are required
to act so as to uphold their noumenal character. The maxim of self-destruction cannot be
freely willed universal since its objectification would uproot freedom itself from the world,
hence destroying a precondition for establishing such a universal law in the first place.
95 LE, page 144.
96 Ibid., page 145.
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Morality itself (or the possibility thereof), in a sense, is consequently eliminated from the 
world through committing suicide.
3.2.3 Kant’s Religious Condemnation of Suicide
A third type of argument that Kant offers against the moral permissibility of suicide, as
found in LE, stems from religious considerations. To be sure, Kant argues that religious
reasons for regarding suicide as morally impermissible have little force if God’s reasons for
abhorring suicide are not first clarified:
Suicide...is impermissible and abhorrent, not because God has 
forbidden it; God has forbidden it, rather, because it is abhorrent.
So all moralists must begin by demonstrating its inherent 
abhorrency.98
Kant seems to be suggesting an answer to a similar ‘paradox’ as Socrates’ proposed
dilemma in Plato’s Euthyphro99’. God deems suicide as wrong because it is abhorrent, not
vice versa; and what makes it abhorrent, presumably, is that it is immoral. Despite this
qualification, Kant nevertheless offers an argument against the moral permissibility of
suicide based on religious considerations as follows:
We have been placed in this world for certain destinies and 
purposes; but a suicide flouts the intention of his creator. He 
arrives in the next world as one who has deserted his post, and 
must therefore be seen as a rebel against God. So long as we 
acknowledge this truth, that the preservation of our life is among 
God’s purposes, we are in duty bound to regulate our free actions 
in accordance with it. We have neither the right nor the authority 
to do violence to our nature’s preservative powers, or to upset the 
wisdom of her arrangements. This responsibility lies upon us until 
such time as God gives us his express command to depart this 
world.
Men are stationed here like sentries, and so we must not 
leave our post until relieved by the beneficent hand of another. He 
is our proprietor, and we His property, and His providence 
ensures what is best for us: A bondman who is under the care of a 
kindly master invites punishment if he defies the latter’s
97 Ibid., page 144.
98 LE, page 149.
99 See Plato’s Euthyphro, page 14.
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intentions.100
I offer Kant’s religious argument against suicide merely to illustrate the myriad of 
different perspectives from which the moral standing of blameworthy suicide can be 
examined. Above, we have seen Kant’s arguments in LE for the impermissibility of non­
heroic suicide. As shown in the next section, identical conclusions are reached in FPMM.
3.3 Suicide in Kant’s Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic o f Morals
Kant’s discussion regarding suicide found in FPMM is restricted to an explication of how 
subjective maxims are to be applied to the various formulations of the categorical 
imperative. Both instances offered therein mimic earlier discussions in LE, yet are worth 
reiterating here.
In order to illustrate the first formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant
applies it to four examples, the first of which is a suicidal maxim (as discussed in Chapter
One). As in the case of the arguments from self-love, suicide is here condemned as morally
wrong for similar reasons. Kant writes:
A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied 
of life, but still so far in possession o f his reason that he can ask 
himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to 
take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his 
action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is:
From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its 
longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction. It is 
asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can 
become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a 
system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by 
means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the 
improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could 
not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly 
exist as a universal law of nature, and consequently would be 
wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty 
(Emphasis mine).101
A number of interesting issues are raised in the above quote. First, Kant assumes that the
100 LE, page 149.
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agent in question is in possession of a certain rational capacity. This assumption is
worrisome in several respects, one of which being central to our current project: considering
that an extensive number of irrational human beings commit suicide, and, considering the
championed role that rationality plays in the psychology of Kant’s conception of the moral
agent, Kant’s ethical theory does not possess the conceptual resources for addressing some
of the current concerns regarding suicide, especially some of those stemming from
contemporary research in psychology. I will attend to an elucidation of this worry in the next
chapter. For now, suffice it to say that an ethic of suicide needs to account for irrational
people (qua human beings) who commit suicide, yet Kant’s ethic does not seem to do so.
Second, Kant formulates the agent’s maxim in a specific way. It does not follow,
however, that this is the only possible suicidal maxim. In other words, many differing
characterizations of maxims may follow from the above situation or situations similar to it.
Again, this worry will be fleshed out in the next chapter. Worth mentioning, however, is an
example of a suicidal maxim that differs from Kant’s, as presented by Michael Cholbi:
Admittedly, describing the suicidal agent’s maxim is challenging.
The oft-heard metaphor of a person as simply a ‘shell’ 
surrounding a deadened will suggests the maxim might run as 
follows: Because I no longer can value ends, I take my own life in 
order to be rid of my body, the instrument of desire and of the 
pursuit of ends--so as to bring my physical being in line with my 
psychological being.102
The point is that, when testing a suicidal maxim for its universalizability, we need to 
consider a very large amount of contextual data simply to be able to account for the variance 
across circumstances within which different agents act. Presumably, if we cannot survey all 
of the relevant circumstantial information, the possibility of an ethic of suicide that applies 
to all cases of suicide imaginable seems unrealistic at best. The extent to which Cholbi’s 
Kantian suicidal maxim differs from Kant’s original formulation demonstrates reason to take
101 FPMM, page 50.
102 Cholbi (2002), page 249.
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this concern seriously.
The second account of suicide found in the FPMM results from Kant’s illustration
of the practical application of a subjective maxim to the second formulation of the
categorical law. Although almost identical in context, the application of the second
formulation yields results that are different from, yet consistent with, the first. Kant writes:
He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his 
action could be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in 
itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful 
circumstances, he uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a 
tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, 
that is to say, something that can be used merely as a means, but 
must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself.
I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own 
person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (Kant’s 
emphasis).103
Treating oneself and others as ends in themselves, rather than merely as utilities, represents 
for Kant a supreme limiting condition on all action. By committing suicide, the agent is not 
respecting herself as an end, but merely as a means to some other desired end. Because of 
this, as Kant argues in the above quote, such a maxim violates one’s duty to act so as to treat 
one’s and others’ humanity unexceptionally as ends in themselves, rather than merely as 
means to ends.
Our exposition of Kant’s account of suicide as found in FPMM is appropriately 
brief. However, before proceeding to an examination of his views on suicide as found in 
MM, I mention two further ideas that should be kept in mind, both of which make up central 
themes in our final chapter. First, nowhere in his account of the moral standing of suicide 
does Kant offer an account of the phenomenology of death or how it relates to the 
immorality of suicide. The prima facie worry is that, by failing to do so, Kant consequently 
fails to recognise the possibility of death being something positive in nature, in which case, 
possibly conducive to being sought out rationally.
103 FPMM, page 58.
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Second, the only intervention or prevention technique Kant has on offer with 
respect to suicide is the force of the moral law itself. Kant, however, fails to acknowledge 
the possibility that some human beings may not be considered under his moral theory, and 
hence that there may be cases where the categorical imperative procedure would be of no 
help in aiding an agent in moral deliberation. Furthermore, if certain irrational agents are to 
be deterred from acting immorally (committing suicide), then those who are to intervene 
require some way to successfully prevent the agent from doing so. The categorical 
imperative may not be sufficient (or relevant) ammunition for aiding or informing the 
intervener since this method assumes that the suicidal person would listen to or understand 
what reason prescribes they ought to do, and subsequently follow this dictation, an 
assumption that seems misguided where the suicidal person in question is irrational. Again, 
these issues are taken up later. They are mentioned here simply to make my critical 
intentions clear from the outset.
3.4 Suicide in The Metaphysics o f  Morals
Of the three main texts examined here regarding Kant’s suicidology, MM  offers what is 
perhaps his most interesting account of the moral impermissibility of suicide. Here, I discuss 
the two main arguments Kant puts forth in MM, along with a discussion of the casuistical 
questions he advanced at the end of the section devoted to suicide. The two arguments found 
here are similar in many respects to the one’s already examined; the casuistical questions are 
what make his discussion in MM interesting, for they are both mysterious and worrisome.
In Part One, Book One, Chapter One of the Doctrine of Virtue entitled “A Human 
Being’s Duty to Himself as an Animal Being,” Kant states that self-preservation is the 
primal duty of a human agent of this sort.104 Two acts are thought by Kant to be direct
104 MM, page 176. Kant writes: “The first, though not the principle, duty o f a human being to himself 
as an animal being is to preserve himself in his animal nature”.
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violations of this duty, namely, self-mutilation and the total killing of oneself. For Kant, 
killing oneself constitutes self-murder, and hence is a criminal act; suicide is not just 
morally reprehensible, but legally as well. Moreover, suicide can be reprehensible either 
with respect to the agent herself or with respect to others (what has come to be referred to as 
“Other-Regarding arguments” against suicide105). I focus mainly on Kant’s reasons for the 
former condemnation of suicide, but will first speak briefly to the latter.
Kant gives several examples that constitute a violation of strict duties to oneself 
with regards to others through suicide. For example, when a pregnant mother ends her life, 
taking the unborn child’s life along with hers; suicide as a violation against a spouse (“until 
death do us part...”) or one’s children (as dependents); violations against other people as 
fellow citizens; and even a violation against God.106 We are not primarily concerned with 
Kant’s arguments based on considerations of others since such arguments tell us nothing 
about whether suicide is permissible in cases where no other-regarding considerations exist. 
For this reason, such arguments at best yield impartial verdicts with respect to the general 
moral standing of suicide, as paradigmatically involving only one human being. In following 
the lead of our minimalist definition of suicide offered earlier (see SI, page 7), we are 
concerned primarily with a minimalist conception of the suicidal situation, which is to say 
where only one individual is (directly) involved.
Kant offers two arguments against suicide in MM. The first is somewhat different 
from what we have already seen, for it includes the idea that it is more courageous to 
continue living, rather than to commit suicide out of a fear of life (or through the absence of 
fear of death). Kant writes:
It seems absurd to say that a human being could wrong himself.
105 For a discussion o f Other-regarding arguments against suicide, see for example Cosculluela’s The 
Ethics o f  Suicide (1995).
106 Kant argues that suicide may be thought o f  as a violation towards God as Other since it constitutes 
“one’s [i.e. the suicide’s] abandoning the post assigned him in the world without having been called 
away from it” (MM, 177).
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Hence the Stoic thought it a prerogative of his (the sage’s) 
personality to depart from his life at his discretion (as from a 
smoke-filled room) with peace of soul, free from the pressure of 
present or anticipated ills, because he could be of no more use in 
life. But there should have been in this very courage, this strength 
of soul not to fear death and to know of something that a human 
being can value even more highly than his life, a still stronger 
motive for him not to destroy himself, a being with such powerful 
authority over the strongest sensible incentives, and so not to 
deprive himself of life.107
This argument attacks the Stoic belief in the moral permissibility of suicide.108 According to
Kant, if one can face the indeterminateness of death with a courageous attitude, then, despite
one’s reasons for contemplating suicide, one must have equal courage for remaining alive,
hence not committing the suicidal act. By suggesting that it is more courageous to continue
living in the face of a boring, or useless, or mediocre, or unhappy life, Kant is merely
offering another incentive to avoid acting on the suicidal maxim. Despite the seeming
uniqueness of this argument, it nevertheless plays on the idea that debasing one’s humanity
for phenomenal reasons is morally impermissible.
Kant’s second argument found in MM runs as follows:
A human being cannot renounce his personality as long as he is a 
subject of duty, hence as long as he lives; and it is a contradiction 
that he should be authorized to withdraw from all obligation, that 
is, freely to act as if no authorization were needed for this action.
To annihilate the subject of morality in one’s own person is to 
root out the existence of morality itself from the world, as far as
one can, even though morality is an end in itself. Consequently,
disposing of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end is 
debasing humanity in one’s person, to which man was 
nevertheless entrusted for preservation.109
The argument given here falls into both the category of suicide done from self-love and
suicide as eliminating freedom from the world. On one hand, Kant reiterates that moral
agents, as noumenal beings, are not allowed to debase their noumenal aspects, so as to give
107 MM, page 177.
108 For an informative account o f the Stoic view regarding the moral standing o f suicide, especially 
how it relates to Kant’s own views, see Michael J. Seidler’s “Kant and the Stoics on Suicide” (1983).
109 MM, page 177.
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in to phenomenal desires. All cases of blameworthy suicide are indicative of debasing the 
agent’s moral personality, and hence acting from animalistic motives. On the other hand, 
using freedom for the sake of eliminating freedom from the world, and abolishing the 
possibility of morality along with it, is self-contradictory. In essence, if such a maxim were 
universalized, there would no longer exist a world inhabited by rational and free agents so as 
to ensure the existence of morality in the first place.
This marks the last of Kant’s specific arguments for the immorality of suicide to 
be examined. According to Kant, whether it be a case of suicide from self-love, of 
eliminating freedom from the world, from religious concerns or otherwise, all blameworthy 
suicide is morally impermissible. Before offering some suggestions for the proper 
establishment of a sound ethic of suicide, suggestions which present themselves through 
issues raised throughout our previous discussion, one more topic is taken up from MM: 
Kant’s mysterious and vague casuistical questions.
3.4.1 On Kant’s Casuistical Questions Regarding Suicide110
Kant offers four “casuistical questions” at the end of his discussion of suicide in M M . What 
exactly did Kant have in mind by calling such questions “casuistical”? What was intended 
by including them in his discussion of suicide? What answers (if any) did he believe his 
reader would arrive at once having posed them? The answers to these questions are unclear, 
and hence in need of examination.
According to Kant, the division of ethics labelled “Doctrine of the Elements,” 
which pertains to ‘the concepts of pure practical reason with regards to the duties of moral 
agents,’ is itself split into the divisions of “Dogmatics” and “Casuistry”. About this latter 
distinction Kant writes:
110 See “Casuistical Questions” at the end o f “First Article O f the First Chapter On Killing Oneself,” 
AtM, pages 177-178.
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[Ethics], because of the latitude it allows in its imperfect duties, 
unavoidably leads to questions that call upon judgement to decide 
how a maxim is to be applied in particular cases, and indeed in 
such a way that judgement provides another (subordinate) maxim 
(and one can always ask for yet another principle for applying this 
maxim to cases that may arise). So ethics falls into a casuistry, 
which has no place in the doctrine of right.
Casuistry is, accordingly, neither a science nor a part of 
a science; for in that case it would be dogmatics, and casuistry is 
not so much a doctrine about how to find something as rather a 
practice of how to seek truth. So it is woven into ethics in a 
fragmentary way, not systematically (as dogmatics would have to 
be), and is added to ethics only by way of scholia to the system.111
What then is casuistry? According to Kant, it is the role reserved for judgement in applying
practical laws of morality to concrete situations. What, then, is the role of including several
casuistical questions at the end of his discussion regarding the immorality of suicide?
Presumably, it is to stress the element of context-sensitivity present in all cases of suicide,
the role of experiential judgement in moral deliberation. Whether the suicidal agent in
question seeks to flee a painful life, to preserve her honour, or to avoid infecting others with
rabies, et cetera, all cases of suicide reserve a certain idiosyncratic uniqueness, and hence
require novel maxim formation and evaluation. However, this being said, why then does
Kant not provide answers for his posed casuistical questions, in a sense demonstrating how
to formulate such maxims, apply them to the categorical imperative test, and subsequently
assess their moral standing? The answer to this question remains open, given the information
Kant has left us; hence, any solution proposed remains speculative. The reader is lead to
believe that self-preservation may be an imperfect duty to oneself; yet, were this true, it
would surely contradict Kant’s inclusion of his discussion of suicide in “The Doctrine of
Virtue, Part I, Chapter I, Book I: Perfect Duties to Oneself’ in MM112
In the passage quoted above, Kant suggests that casuistry is reserved for dealing
with issues surrounding imperfect duties, and, in a sense, its role is to aid in judging how a
111 MM, page 169.
112 MM, page 176.
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particular maxim is to be applied in a particular case. Remember, however, that self- 
preservation is a perfect duty to oneself,113 hence not an imperfect duty. Because of this, it 
becomes unclear why casuistry should be associated with issues surrounding suicide in the 
first place. By asking four casuistical questions regarding suicide, Kant may be suggesting 
that suicide is not entirely a perfect duty to begin with. Regardless of the authenticity of this 
worry, the casuistical questions regarding suicide are worrisome in other (somewhat less 
speculative) respects.
Such questions, whether intended to or not by Kant, offer reason to speculate 
further about the conclusions offered regarding the moral standing of suicide found 
throughout his moral works. If Kant’s inclusion of these questions was intended to clarify 
his case against suicide, then they have failed in their purpose; these questions in fact 
confuse the issue more than they aid in its clarification. If Kant’s intention in including such 
questions was to illustrate the context sensitivity of suicidal maxims, or even to offer 
guidance in difficult or atypical cases of suicide, then one has reason to argue that Kant’s 
account is deficient. This is so for two reasons. First, the answers to these questions are left 
open-ended; Kant gives no concrete conclusion in either direction. Because of this, the 
reader is left to decide for herself whether such cases mark (a) cases of suicide or otherwise, 
and (b) if the situation under question is representative of a suicide, whether such cases of 
suicide are morally allowable or otherwise. From Kant’s previous discussion, however, 
insufficient information is provided to adequately aid the reader in doing so.
Secondly, because Kant has left the answers to such questions unavailable, the 
reader is led to believe that the context matters to such a great extent that no ready-made 
principle of morality (the categorical imperative) is sufficient as a guiding principle in 
assessing them, and hence for determining what one ought to do under such highly specific 
circumstances. By way of elucidation, I examine one of the casuistical questions Kant has on
113 MM, page 176.
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
offer.
3.4.2 Suicide as a Cure for Rabies
Kant’s example of the suicidal person infected with rabies serves to illustrate my misgivings
against the inclusion of the casuistical questions.114 Kant writes:
A human being who had been bitten by a mad dog already felt 
hydrophobia [i.e. rabies] coming on. He explained, in a letter he 
left, that, since as far as he knew the disease was incurable, he 
was taking his life lest he harm others as well in his madness (the 
onset of which he already felt). Did he do wrong?115
From this, the rabies maxim may be formulated as follows:
(RM): Can I will that, ‘once infected with rabies, from respect for 
the safety of others around me, I adopt it as a principle to shorten 
my life when its longer duration is likely to bring worsened 
hydrophobia and madness, in which case others may become 
victims of my illness,’ as a universal law?
From our understanding of Kant’s moral philosophy outlined thus far, the answer to the
question posed by Kant above might appear to be “yes, he did do wrong, morally speaking”.
This is the case since the agent acted directly against the supreme duty to himself, namely, to
preserve his life (despite how horrible that life may be). He used his freedom against itself,
in a sense debasing his humanity so as to be deserving of the respect (or «o«-respect)
allotted to a beast, rather than a dignified rational moral agent. The only exception to this
law, as offered by Kant, is if one were to dutifully sacrifice life (‘heroically’) in order to
maintain an honourable and morally good character. From this point of view, the man
clearly acted (at least partially) from motives that were not selfish or from self-love. He
acted so as not to harm other people through the madness accompanied by his disease, in a
sense acting honourably. In other words, the man infected with rabies killed himself in order
114 Omitted here are the questions dealing with smallpox inoculation, royal self-sacrifice for the sake 
of the State, and kamikaze suicide. However, the worries noted here are assumed readily applicable to 
all four questions, not only the one regarding the victim of rabies.
1,5 MM, page 178.
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to uphold other moral ends, say, treating others as ends in themselves. Perhaps then the man 
committed heroic suicide rather than blameworthy suicide, in which case his action was 
morally obligatory rather than punishable. If these considerations are accurate, then our 
answer above becomes questionable, and in need of revision. In fact, it seems that our 
previous answer ought to be replaced with “no, the man did not do wrong, morally 
speaking”.
One further consideration serves to highlight the ambiguity of the situation, 
especially with respect to the maxim (RM) itself. Very little specific contextual information 
is provided regarding the agent himself, other than that he has been infected with rabies, he 
has since committed suicide, and he apparently did so in order to protect others from being 
harmed or infected (as indicated by a note he left behind). But, many relevant questions 
remain unanswered, or their answers are left incomplete. Was the agent rational at the time 
of his suicide? Did the agent inquire into whether a cure for rabies in fact existed, or did he 
take his life based on the assumption that there was none? Was the agent contemplating 
suicide prior to being infected (hence, for some alternative reason)? These and other such 
questions are relevant and need to be answered in order for a proper subjective maxim to be 
formulated in the first place, as well as encouraging the distinction between whether the 
agent’s suicide represented a ‘heroic’ act or a blameworthy one. Because of this, (RM) (as it 
stands) seems inadequate.
It is difficult to speculate what the role is that Kant had reserved for these 
questions in closing his most explicit dealing of suicide in MM. On the one hand, it could 
have been a tool for his reader to apply her newly gained knowledge of morality to concrete 
examples, similar to the exercises found at the close of a beginner’s mathematics textbook. 
In this way, Kant may have been merely stressing the idea that experiential judgement is 
required in order to perfect one’s purely rational grasp of morality. On the other hand, the 
answers may have been left unfixed since they represent difficult moral situations an agent
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may face, where the answer must be worked out in detail only once confronted by the 
situation itself, by making specific reference to the context. If this were the case, one would 
have expected Kant to aid in reaching an answer, rather than relying on his faith in the moral 
agent (his reader) to reach the correct verdict herself. Moreover, Kant offers his conclusions 
on what is and is not moral for the majority of the moral issues raised throughout his 
writings. Why exclude such considerations in this case, knowing that the examples mark 
difficult ethical situations, and that suicide is one o f the most abhorrent o f moral violations 
possible?
This concludes our discussion of Kant’s ethic of suicide. From what has been 
shown throughout this chapter, several worries arise with respect to these views, and hence 
there is reason to argue that Kant’s suicidology is incomplete. It is the purpose of the next 
chapter to examine some of these shortcomings, and, ultimately, to offer some suggestions 
towards establishing an ethic of suicide that is sound.
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IV. Towards an Ethic of Suicide
As indicated in the introduction and throughout Chapter Two, certain shortcomings of 
Kant’s ethic of suicide give reason to argue that his views on morality are incomplete in this 
regard. In fact, Kant fails to acknowledge several relevant ideas that ought to be central 
tenets of any sound suicidology. In this chapter, four general characteristics that a moral 
account of suicide ought to possess are offered. This is not to say that a sound ethic of 
suicide is possible', the ability of meeting such criteria may prove an absurdity in the end. It 
is merely to say that, i f  normative ethics can provide a conclusive verdict regarding the 
moral standing of suicide; i f  an ethic of suicide can be authoritative both theoretically and 
practically, then such an ethic should be based (at least in part) on the four criteria examined 
herein. Kant’s moral theory does not exhibit these characteristics, or, if it does, does so to an 
insufficient degree.
Specifically, the following four ideas are relevant for establishing a sound ethic of 
suicide: (1) be readily applicable to all instances of human suicide; (2) include all human 
beings for moral consideration; (3) inform suicide intervention and prevention practices (if 
such practices are deemed relevant), and (4) take relevant insights regarding the 
phenomenology of death into account. This is not to say that these four criteria taken 
together mark sufficient traits for giving birth to a sound ethic of suicide. Rather, they are 
relevant conditions, and must be dealt with as such. I attend to each in turn.
4.1 Context-inclusiveness
It is not enough to ethically inform the ‘easily’ diagnosed cases or the most common cases 
of suicide that occur in the world. Moreover, it is not sufficient to inform only those cases of 
suicide that are obscure or unlikely. What is needed is an ethic of suicide that is readily 
applicable to all occurrences of suicide (whether actual or hypothetical). To be in the
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possession of an ethic of suicide that applies only to ‘textbook’ cases of suicide, or suicides 
motivated from self-love, et cetera, is to be in the possession of a suicidology with only 
limited applicability.
In part, this criterion demands an accurate and detailed definition of suicide, so as 
to ensure that cases of suicide proper can be distinguished from pseudo-suicides. This being 
said, it is assumed that such a general definition of suicide is currently in place. As noted in 
our introduction, what seems to distinguish suicide from other suicide-like acts is the intent 
on behalf of the suicidal agent, and whether the act is undertaken wilfully or otherwise. 
Assuming that there exists sufficient guidelines for determining whether a case of seeming 
suicide is in fact an instance of suicide (see for example SI outlined in the introduction), 
then all scenarios that meet this definition ought to be accounted for.
Along with a definitive characterization of what distinguishes suicide from 
pseudo-suicide, we require a detailed classificatory system of differing cases of suicide that 
may occur. If some instances of suicide are found morally reprehensible, while others are 
found morally allowable (or obligatory), then a schema must be in place so as to aid in the 
placement of all instances of suicide into their proper category. Kant offered some insight 
here through suggesting the distinction between blameworthy, heroic, and permissible 
suicide (see Chapter Two). All blameworthy suicides represent for Kant an agent’s failure to 
act from duty; all heroic suicides represent an agent’s acting in conformity with her duty; all 
of Kant’s so-called “permissible” suicides are in fact /wewJo-suicides, and hence are morally 
neutral. It was noted in Chapter Two that the labels Kant allots to the latter two types of 
suicide may be misleading; “heroic” suicide does not imply supererogatory action on behalf 
of the agent, but rather an act that she is obligated to perform. Furthermore, “permissible” 
suicides do not represent suicides at all, but rather accidental self-deaths. Whether Kant’s 
classificatory system is accurate (or exhaustive), then, remains an open question.
In our discussion of Kant’s suicidology, it was shown that his views are limited in
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the sense of not being readily applicable to all cases of suicide. Two main points are worth 
reiterating. First, Kant’s casuistic questions offered in MM  remain unanswered and their 
inclusion ‘mysterious’. It was argued that this is in large part due to their complexity, and 
because the intricate details required for proper maxim formation and subsequent testing 
were excluded. Is it, or is it not, one’s duty to commit suicide when infected with rabies 
(assuming there is no cure)? The answer hypothesized earlier was both “yes” and “no,” and, 
therefore, the answer was concluded to be indeterminate and elusive. This is not to say that 
our analysis of the rabies scenario was a complete account of the situation; it is merely to 
say that, given what Kant has on offer, any verdict in this case remains controversial and 
speculative.
Judging from the fact that Kant offered conclusions to most other moral dilemmas 
throughout his writings on ethics, it seems odd for him not to have offered a conclusion 
regarding these difficult cases of supposed violations of the supreme (perfect) duty to 
oneself. It is at least plausible that Kant did not do so since the answers to his casuistic 
questions are difficult to reach and do not readily fit into the framework of the categorical 
imperative test. Because of this, there is reason to believe that Kant’s theoretical ethic of 
suicide is not readily applicable to all cases of suicide equally. Given the way that Kant 
insists on suicide being a perfect duty to oneself, he does not seem open to the possibility of 
having any situation where the moral verdict regarding the specific suicide on hand could be 
ultimately indeterminate. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Kant’s suicidology fails 
to meet one central requirement of a sound ethic of suicide.
The second point is an extension of the first. Since a sound ethic of suicide needs 
to apply to all cases of suicide indiscriminately, that same ethic needs to acknowledge all the 
relevant variables across differing cases of suicide. Intricacies specific to individual cases of 
suicide need to be accounted for when designing the classificatory scheme stressed above. 
Hence, there must be in place specific resources to ensure, not only that all suicides are
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accounted for, but also that all suicides of the same category are judged the same, regardless 
of possible incentives to judge preferentially (or detrimentally). Distinguishing between two 
similar cases of suicide may rest on one minute detail, and this one detail may dictate that 
one case is morally sound while the other reprehensible. In other words, a sound ethic of 
suicide needs to account for all cases of suicide equally—whether the suicidal victim is 
Socrates,116 Maria Von Herbert,117 a Canadian Aboriginal youth, a man infected with rabies, 
or Adolf Hitler,118 and so on and so forth. Yet, it also needs to judge all suicides of the same 
class identically, and account for minute details that may mark exceptions to the rule (such 
exceptions themselves marking separate categories).
For example, although from a Kantian moral perspective Adolf Hitler was not to 
act on his suicidal maxim (say), it may be relevant to argue that his case marks a subclass of 
blameworthy suicide where other facts of the case deem his maxim universalizable. In this 
case, the consideration that Hitler was the driving force behind the inhumane and irrational 
killing of millions of people, violating characteristics sacred to a Kantian perspective of 
morality, may over-ride the prima facie blameworthiness of his action.119 In light of this, 
Hitler’s duty may have been to self-terminate. Hitler’s suicide may have been, say, both 
prima facie blameworthy and, all things considered, obligatory. The point is that exceptions 
to the rules may mark a single case that enumerates a separate category of suicide all to 
itself; nevertheless, a classificatory scheme for suicide with respect to morality needs to be 
equally extensive as there are variations across the types of possible suicide.
This is not to say that Kant failed to meet this criteria; in fact, insofar as one is a
116 It is assumed here that Socrates in fact committed suicide. For an interesting argument in support 
of this, see R. G. Frey’s “Did Socrates Commit Suicide?” (1978).
117 Maria Von Herbert was an acquaintance o f Kant who sought his advice, and who, after repeatedly 
asking Kant for help, ended her own life. The correspondence between the two is included in Kant’s 
Correspondence.
118 Although much controversy continues to surround Adolf Hitler’s death, it is widely held that he 
committed suicide. For an interesting account see Redlich (1993).
119 Perhaps Hitler’s suicide may be considered as an instance o f capital punishment, which is, 
according to Kant, something all murderers deserve in consequence o f their murderous actions. See
69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
moral agent to begin with, the moral law is thought to be indiscriminately applicable. As we 
shall see next, however, problems arise with respect to who is to be considered a moral agent 
in the first place.
4.2 Consideration of All Possible Victims of Suicide
The main precept here to be followed is (roughly) “exclude no human being from moral 
consideration, whether irrational, hedonistic, young, homosexual, et cetera” .120 This 
amounts to saying that, because almost any representative of the human species is able to 
commit suicide; since many types of human beings do commit suicide, then a sound ethic of 
suicide needs to account for human beings in general, whether past, present, or future, actual 
or merely possible.
Kant’s account of the moral standing of suicide finds its applicability restricted to
rational beings only. Kant writes:
[Since] moral laws ought to hold good for every rational 
creature, we must derive them from the general concept of a 
rational being. (Emphasis mine).121
Clearly, Kant is shown here as founding morality on rationality. Morality is not restricted to
human beings per se; if such human beings were in fact without the ability to be rational,
then the moral law would no longer apply to them. Yet, there exist human beings who
commit suicide and who are not rational at the time of their suicide.122 The failure here on
MM, pages 106-109.
120 “Human being” is understood here from a biological perspective.
121 FPMM, page 39.
122 How do we know that a victim o f suicide was in fact mentally ill at the time o f their death? 
Specifically, if  no knowledge o f the victim’s being mentally ill were available or obvious before her 
suicide, then would it not be purely speculative to judge her mentally ill after she has already died? 
Although much debate continues surrounding such questions, researchers have begun to centre 
around one important tool in assessing a person’s mental state at the time o f  her death, after she is 
already dead. This tool is what Edwin Shneidman coined the psychological autopsy. The 
psychological autopsy is a procedure whose function is to classify ambiguous deaths, that is, ones 
whose cause remains uncertain, for example, distinguishing between true suicides versus accidental 
self-death. It is psychological since, in essence, the victim’s mental state is under questioning, since it 
may be thought to have had an influence on why that person has since died. Although the
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Kant’s behalf is not just that he does not consider irrational human beings as moral agents, 
but that he does not even take them to be moral patients. Kant’s failure in this regard is 
unacceptable.
4.2.1 Moral Agency versus Moral Patienthood
One consequence of adopting a Kantian account of morality is that people who are irrational 
are not considered to be moral agents. Yet, as a subclass of irrational entities, people who 
are mentally ill nevertheless commit actions that, were such people to be moral agents, 
would be deemed as immoral, counter dutiful—suicide being a paradigm example of this. 
How is an ethic of suicide to account for this?
It is not clear that non-moral agents who act ‘immorally’ can be held morally 
responsible. In fact, it seems a truism to say that where a moral code does not apply to 
person x, person x  cannot be morally punished for any of her actions that go against that 
moral code. Because of this, however, certain questions arise: if most cases of suicide find 
the victim mentally ill at the time of her death, and people who are mentally ill are not moral 
agents to begin with, then does it follow that most cases of suicide are not issues relevant to 
normative ethics in the first place (at least from a Kantian perspective)? If not, to what 
extent ought rational agents to intervene in suicidal situations, in a sense imposing their 
moral code on those to whom it does not apply? In other words, if certain beings do not meet 
the criteria for moral agency under a rationalistic moral code (irrational beings), then it 
follows that such a rationalistic moral code does not directly apply to their actions. From a 
rationalistic moral perspective, just because suicide is against one’s duty as a rational being, 
it does not follow that it is an immoral act for irrational beings to commit, since our
psychological autopsy must be assumed as being only one asset in a group o f many which in 
conjunction with each other help to paint a clearer picture o f the death under question, it has become 
recognized as a valuable tool for the purposes o f therapeutic assessment. See Berman (1993) and 
Jacobs & Klein (1993) for thorough accounts o f the role o f psychological autopsies with respect to
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
conception of duty is based on our conception of morality as rationalistic . If a rationalistic 
moral code is not applicable to irrational people, then ought we to prevent such people from 
committing suicide, all along our motives for intervention being that such acts are contrary 
to a rationalistic  moral code?
Perhaps we ought to group human beings who are mentally ill together with other 
entities lacking sufficient rationality to reason about and apply a rationalistic moral code, 
like young children and animals. Perhaps, although we may not be able to hold such entities 
as being morally respon sib le , we nevertheless have moral obligations  towards them. In this 
sense, people who are mentally ill can be said to be moral pa tien ts , despite not being 
afforded moral agency. The possibility needs to be considered that if a being is not a moral 
agent, she may still be a moral patient. A moral agent is a being who has moral obligations 
or responsibilities; a moral patient is a being (or entity) toward whom (or which) an agent 
has moral obligations or responsibilities. In maintaining a strategy adopted with respect to 
our conception of suicide as being problematic (see the Introduction), I assume that people 
who are mentally ill need to be considered moral patien ts, if only tentatively. This means 
that, at least until further progress has been made in this area, irrational human beings may 
be considered beings toward whom rational agents have obligations. Although the extent of 
this obligation remains unclear, it may include intervention and prevention practices, as well 
as education on the issues surrounding suicide in general.
It at least seems p rim a  fa c ie  plausible to argue that, if  suicide is wrong for som e  
human beings to commit (that is, those who are rational), then it is equally wrong for a ll 
p o ssib le  human beings  to commit, regardless of the moral doctrine adopted or rational 
standing of the victim. However, this intuition must remain but one possible hypothesis 
(among many), for it may prove to be the case that people who are mentally ill and who 
commit suicide are not to be held morally responsible for their actions, nor that genuine
suicidology.
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moral agents have any obligations towards them in this regard. This is not to say that 
irrational people are not deserving of respect as fellow human beings, or that we ought to 
adopt a laissez faire attitude with respect to the suicides that occur within this demographic. 
It is to say that an ethic that stresses the role of reason (as Kant’s does) has serious 
difficulties when dealing with issues surrounding a) whether it is morally impermissible (or 
otherwise) for people who are mentally ill (irrational) to commit suicide, and b) whether 
rational agents (people who are not mentally ill) have the right or the responsibility to 
intervene in, prevent, or judge the suicides of the mentally ill (irrational).
For our purposes it is assumed that all human beings are deserving of at least 
minimal moral status. Nevertheless, certain ugly possibilities must be acknowledged: it may 
turn out to be the case that people who are irrational require a drastically altered moral 
doctrine from those who are rational; it may turn out that no rationalistic moral code can be 
(or ought to be) applied to those who are irrational; it may turn out that only those suicides 
where the victim is rational are relevant to normative ethics; it may turn out that suicide is 
not something to be avoided or condemned as immoral in the first place. Despite what the 
future of suicidology has in store, the prudent course for now is the one that assumes suicide 
to be a problem, which entails that all cases of suicide are in-themselves problematic as well, 
and hence that irrational human beings are to be afforded (at minimum) moral patienthood.
4.2.2 Kant on Mental Illness
A significant number of suicide victims suffer from mental health problems at the time of
their death. Research by the Canadian Mental Health Association (2003) concluded that:
People with mood disorders [e.g. depression, bipolar disorder, et 
cetera] are at a particularly high risk of suicide. Studies indicate 
that more than 90 percent of suicide victims have a diagnosable 
psychiatric illness, and suicide is the most common cause of death 
for people with schizophrenia.123
123 Canadian Mental Heath Association, (2003).
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Judging from this data, it becomes clear that, at least in Canada, suicide is highly correlated 
with mental illness, most notably schizophrenia and severe mood disorders. In fact, from the 
above quote it becomes apparent that more people diagnosed with schizophrenia die from 
suicide than die from any one ‘natural’ cause (for example, old age) by comparison. Because 
of this—since such human beings do commit suicide—any apt suicidology must account for 
those human beings who are mentally ill at the time of their suicide.
Although Kant does spend some time discussing mental illness and insanity, his 
story remains morally neutral, vague, and underdeveloped. Nevertheless, a look at Kant’s 
views on human psychology gives hope in answering two related questions. First, are people 
who are mentally ill considered (by Kant) to be irrational? In other words, is irrationality a 
common symptom of mental illness? Second, does Kant discuss whether or not people who 
are mentally ill are deserving of moral consideration (and associated moral responsibility)? 
In other words, although reason reserves its right as one of the two basic tenets of Kant’s 
moral philosophy, are mentally ill persons, as irrational, afforded any moral considerations 
whatsoever?
In AP, Kant writes:
On the side of the border of mental disorder is the sudden change 
of moods (raptus), an unexpected leap from one subject to a 
totally different without apparent motivation. Occasionally, the 
change precedes every disturbance as an indication; but 
frequently the mind is already so disorganized that such attacks of 
irregularity become the rule. Suicide is often just the result of a 
raptus. Because he who, in the violence of emotion, has slit his 
throat will soon after patiently allow it to be sewn up again.124
Prima facie, Kant is suggesting that mental illness portrays symptoms closely related to
irrationality, namely, a disorganized mind. If one wanted to diagnose the victim’s state of
mind in the suicidal case outlined above, it seems plausible to suggest that the victim was
irrational at the time of his attempted suicide, since his mind was “disorganized”.
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Furthermore, it is not clear what Kant is implying when he writes that suicide is often just 
the result of a sudden change in one’s mood. Admittedly, Kant does not pretend to provide 
any moral conclusions in AP. But, as seen elsewhere, suicide is a moral problem for Kant, 
and hence any information Kant provides about suicide in general may serve to properly 
formulate his overall view of its moral standing. According to Kant, any action through 
sudden impulse, or emotion, or desire, or inclination, is an action linked to the phenomenal 
nature of human beings. It is animalistic. Is this to say that, because the agent is not acting 
from reason, that the agent is acting irrationally (or non-rationally)?
According to Kant, with regard to sense perception, mental disturbance is either 
characterized as irrationality or as insanity.125 This suggests that a distinction can be drawn 
between irrationality and insanity (for our purposes, the latter being roughly identical to 
mental illness). The crucial point is, however, that both irrationality and insanity fall under 
the same (admittedly vague) category of “mental disturbances in sensory perception”. As a 
mental disturbance, irrationality may be assumed to be a mental illness, at least to a minimal 
extent. As it turns out, Kant goes on to blur the distinction between insanity and irrationality. 
Kant writes:
The simpleton, the imprudent, the stupid, the coxcomb, the fool, 
and the buffoon are all different from the mentally disordered.
They differ not merely in degree but in the distinctive quality of 
mental discord. Despite their failings these people do not belong 
in a madhouse.126
This suggests that their exists a difference between stupidity (say) and irrationality, but not 
necessarily one between irrationality and insanity (mental illness); madmen must have other 
people reason for them, even in cases where the matters are trivial. Elsewhere, Kant offers 
further reason to believe that mental illness and irrationality are quite synonymous, or at 
least highly correlated. Under the heading “On Mental Ailments,” Kant describes an
124 AP, page 110.
125 AP, page 97.
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instance of insanity as follows:
Insanity is that disturbance of the mind, wherein everything the 
insane person relates, is in accord with the possibility of an 
experience, and indeed with the formal laws of thought; but, 
because of falsely inventive imagination, self-concocted ideas are 
treated as if they were perceptions. Those who believe they are 
everywhere surrounded by enemies, and those who regard all 
glances, words, and otherwise indifferent actions of others as 
directed against them personally and as traps set for them belong 
to this category. These people, in their unfortunate madness, are 
often so acute at interpreting as directed against them what others 
do inadvertently, that, if the data were only true, we would be 
obliged to pay the highest respect to their understanding. I  have 
seen nobody who has ever been healed o f this illness (because to 
be mad with reason is a peculiar sort o f predisposition).
However, they are not to be counted among the asylum fools, 
because, being concerned only with themselves, they direct their 
supposed craftiness only to their own welfare, without putting 
anyone else in danger. Consequently they do not need to be 
locked up for the sake of safety.127 (Emphasis mine).
This excerpt is the most in-depth account of insanity Kant has on offer. Unfortunately, it
remains vague. Through interpreting this quote, we find reasons for arguing both that
insanity and irrationality are mutually exclusive and mutually inclusive. With respect to the
former verdict, by saying things such as ‘the insane person’s mind is in accord with the
formal laws of thought,’ and ‘if what the insane person were saying were true, then their
understanding is deserving of high respect,’ and, the ambiguous phrase128, “to be mad with
reason is a peculiar sort of disposition,” Kant seems to suggest that the insane person is not
properly labelled “totally irrational”. With regard to the latter verdict, on the other hand, by
saying things such as ‘the insane person experiences delusions of the mind,’ that ‘insane
people exhibit a most unfortunate madness,’ and, again, the ambiguous phrase “to be mad
with reason is a peculiar sort of disposition,” Kant seems to be suggesting that the insane
person is irrational, hence not rational.
Due to the limited information provided by Kant, as well as certain inherent
126 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
127 AP, page 112.
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tensions in the account of mental illness he does offer, we are restricted to drawing the 
somewhat weak conclusion that people who are mentally ill are irrational, at least in certain 
respects. Rationality and irrationality can be understood as coming in degrees. In other 
words, although no concrete conclusions may be drawn, there is some reason to argue that 
Kant himself believed some sort of irrationality to be a common symptom of insanity 
(mental illness). If this is the case, then it follows that Kant’s rationalistic ethic does not 
afford moral consideration to those people who are mentally ill (due to their lack of 
rationality), at least if their mental disturbance is sufficiently serious that they cannot 
properly consider and apply the moral law. To repeat, this is worrisome since a significant 
number of people who commit suicide are mentally ill at the time of their death.
Although reaching a clear picture of the role irrationality plays in insanity is 
somewhat elusive with reference to Kant’s psychology, other literature has been devoted to 
the same issue. In his article “Insanity Vs. Irrationality,” Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
discusses contemporary literature in the philosophy of law that views insanity as entailing 
irrationality. Although Sinnott-Armstrong’s purposes are somewhat orthogonal to ours, his 
review of the literature illustrates that the idea that irrationality is symptomatic of insanity is 
not a new one, or a minority opinion, albeit a controversial one. Philosophers such as 
Feinberg,129 Fingarette,130 and Moore131 have all argued that irrationality and insanity are 
closely related, the former for the most part being a symptom of the latter.
For example, in his Law and Psychiatry, Moore claims both that “one is a moral 
agent only if one is a rational agent,” and that “mental illness in ordinary understanding 
means an incapacity for rational action”.132 For our purposes, two points will suffice. First, 
Moore demonstrates one instance of an argument in favour of irrationality being closely
128 “Peculiar” can mean any number o f things, from “odd” or “strange,” to “absurd” or “surreal”.
129 See Feinberg (1970).
130 See Fingarette (1972).
131 See Moore (1984).
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related to insanity. Although the issue remains open and (admittedly) somewhat 
controversial, the point is that current literature indicates that it is at least fathomable that 
irrationality is a common symptom of mental illness. Secondly, Moore foreshadows the fate 
of Kantian moral theory in regards to this issue quite nicely. If morality only pertains to 
rational agents, and certain human beings are not rational agents, then certain human beings 
are not morally considered (under Kantianism). Although this claim remains speculative and 
in need of much elucidation, it serves to highlight the need for the “inclusiveness” criteria in 
a sound ethic of suicide, to account for all human beings.
4.2.3 Irrationality, Insanity, and Suicide
Research findings have concluded time and again that there exists a very strong correlation
between suicide and mental illness, so much so that it is estimated by some that ninety-eight
percent of human beings who commit suicide are mentally ill at the time of their death.133 In
his Lectures on the History o f Moral Philosophy, John Rawls writes:
[Kant] always takes for granted, as part of the fact of reason, that 
all persons {barring the mentally retarded and the insane) 
acknowledge the supreme principle of practical reason as 
authoritative for their will. (Emphasis mine).134
This is striking for anyone interested in Kant’s suicidology. If the mentally ill are irrational
(and both Kant himself and Rawls talking of Kant suggest that they are), then it would seem
that the pure practical law of morality does not apply to such non-rational beings. They are
left without the help of Kant’s normative views, just as are irrational animals, rocks, bowling
balls, and coat hangers. In other words, Kant’s moral philosophy does not apply to, and
cannot act as a compass for, people who are mentally ill, entities that are not rational, or
those whose rational capacity is otherwise impaired or underdeveloped.
132 See Sinnott-Armstrong (1987), page 8.
133 See Cholbi (2002).
134 Rawls (2000), page 148.
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Objection One: But Kant is not limiting his moral theory to those agents who are rational 
and free. Rather, his theory is significantly more inclusive: the domain of moral agency 
allotted by Kant includes whoever has a natural capacity to be rational and free. Therefore, 
just because someone is not rational does not necessarily exempt them from moral 
consideration, insofar as they possess such a natural capacity.
If this objection is accurate, then what has been said regarding the exclusion of 
irrational people from Kant’s moral doctrine is misleading. The objection, however, is not 
accurate, as a brief thought experiment serves to demonstrate. Imagine a human being with a 
severe mental illness, say, schizophrenia. Imagine also that this person has yet to develop 
her faculty of understanding; imagine her to be a young child. Imagine also that this 
particular human being exhibits the most severe and intense symptoms of schizophrenic 
behaviour ever recorded. Her symptoms include, but are not limited to, the following: severe 
and highly pervasive delusions, upheld despite strong evidence offered contrary to those 
beliefs; severe and highly pervasive hallucinations, defined as unjustified false and abnormal 
perceptions of the world and its objects, stemming from all five senses135; disorganized 
speech, neologisms, and “word salads”; grossly disorganized behaviour, including 
inappropriate emotional reactions, catatonia, and poor impulse control; severe thought 
blocking (slowed thinking); avolition (loss of energy); anhedonia (the inability to experience 
pleasure); and attention deficits (including poor concentration), anxiety, and depression. 
Next, imagine the person under consideration having committed suicide. It is asked merely 
whether or not this person had the capacity to be rational in the first place, as a 
characteristic demanded by the objection considered.
If the answer is “yes” (which seems unlikely), then Kant’s moral theory needs to
135 The latter two symptoms fall under what has been termed “thought-content symptomatology”. 
According to Marshall and Firestone (1999), “although the beliefs and perceptual experiences 
expressed are irrational, the ability to express them coherently may be more or less intact” (page 
350). (Emphasis mine).
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account for this particular person’s situation, despite her seeming irrationality, which it does 
not do (judging in part from Rawls’ comment)—the agent’s correct application of her 
maxim to the categorical imperative test seems un-executable where the agent is irrational. 
On the other hand, if the answer is “no,” then Kant’s moral theory equally needs to account 
for her. This is because she is a member of a group that marks one of the highest suicide 
rates in Canada per capita, not to mention that she is a human being. The point is clear: 
although this marks an extreme case of a schizophrenic human being who committed 
suicide, it is undeniable that it is nevertheless a case that Kant’s moral theory does not 
account for. Any complete ethic of suicide needs to account for such cases.
Objection Two: Kant’s moral theory does account for people who are mentally ill. In a
sense, Kant accounts for all irrational beings when he accounts for young children who have
not yet developed a full rational faculty. In such cases, it is a right of the rational people
involved (paradigmatically the child’s parents) to guide the youth’s actions in a moral and
rational manner. Perhaps the same can be said of people who are mentally ill; it is the duty
of those who are rational to take care of the irrational person and to guide them morally.
This objection fares as poorly as the first.
In MM  Kant argues for the right of parents over their children:
From this duty there must necessarily also arise the right of 
parents to manage and develop the child, as long as he has not yet 
mastered the use of his members or of his understanding: the right 
not only to feed and care for him but to educate him, to develop 
him both pragmatically, so that in the future he can look after 
himself and make his way in life, and morally, since otherwise the 
fault for having neglected him would fall on his parents. They 
have the right to do all this until the time of his emancipation, 
when they renounce their parental right to direct him as well as 
any claim to be compensated for their support and pains up till 
now. (Emphasis mine).136
Part of the reason that parents have a right over their children is due to the child’s being in a
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state o f development, especially where issues of moral education are concerned. As a fully 
developed rational agent in that same world, the parent is required to guide the child’s 
actions, the hope being that someday the child may be fostered in such a way so as to be able 
to effectively guide her own actions. The crucial point is that, until that time comes, the 
young child is not a rational agent (at least according to Kant).
However, by way of rebutting the objection noted above, one further point needs 
to be considered. The relationship between a child and her parents is significantly different 
from the relationship between a rational person and an unrelated individual having a severe 
mental illness. The parent has obligations towards her child because the child was created by 
her, in effect brought into this world through her previous actions. Moreover, of the child it 
is thought that she ‘will one day become rational,’ or has the potential to be rational, and 
hence, with respect to Kantianism, will one day become a moral agent. The severe 
schizophrenic person, conversely, does not necessarily have such a binding relationship with 
other persons. What is more, the irrational person may never become rational (or even 
thought to be able to become rational), or be susceptible to rational persuasion in the first 
place. In effect, the rational agent may not have a right over the irrational person (something 
the parent has over the child), and the irrational person may not respond to rational 
persuasion by the rational person (something the child does, albeit partly through 
dependence). At best, to equate the role of the child with the role of the irrational or 
mentally ill is worrisome.
Adolescent suicide now becomes an issue of even greater interest, seeing how such 
victims may simultaneously be irrational on two counts: on the one hand, their ability to 
reason may not yet be (fully) developed; and, on the other hand, they may have lost 
whatever reason they once possessed due to the onset of mental illness (for example, severe 
schizophrenia). In such cases, Kant’s suicidology is devastatingly insufficient. In effect, it
136 MM, page 65.
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seems that to say that human beings ought not to kill themselves because reason dictates that 
such a maxim is contradictory to upholding morality, human autonomy, and humanity in 
general, is to say that suicidal victims ought not to be mentally ill at the time o f their suicide.
4.3 Prevention & Intervention
Of what use are arguments in an actual suicide case? Could you, 
or Plato, or Aquinas, or Kant argue my mother out of committing 
suicide?137
If suicide is found to be morally impermissible, then intervention should be informed by an 
adequate ethic of suicide. If suicide is found morally allowable, then the appropriate 
educational, medical and institutional measures are equally in need of consideration and 
implementation. This is to say, a sound suicidology must be rich enough to inform 
intervention practices. This is so since questions of what types of intervention (if any) are 
permissible or otherwise in life and death situations are considered ethical issues. If Kantian 
suicidology lacks the conceptual resources to be in a position to offer moral advice on 
whether suicide intervention is acceptable, and if so, on what kind of intervention, then it is 
incomplete. Since Kant seems to allot moral agency only to rational entities, and since many 
victims of suicide appear to lack rational status (due to mental illness) when they self- 
terminate, there is found reason to argue that Kant’s suicidology (and moral theory in 
general) may not have the conceptual resources needed to inform intervention practices. 
This is not to say that an ethical theory needs to offer detailed prescriptions regarding 
intervention strategies; rather, this is to say that such ethical theory would be maximally 
helpful were it sufficiently rich to morally constrain or otherwise guide suicide intervention 
procedures.
137 Taken from David Novak’s Suicide and Morality: The Theories o f  Plato, Aquinas and Kant and 
their Relevance fo r  Suicidology, page 119.
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4.3.1 Kant’s Practical Ethics & Suicide Intervention
Although suicide intervention is not one of the main concerns in this work, some research
currently being done in this area relates to issues that are central here. In “Suicide
Intervention and Non-Ideal Kantian Theory,” Michael J. Cholbi argues for a Kantian vision
of suicide intervention he takes to satisfy the demands of moral action as prescribed by Kant,
and allows for modes of paternalistic suicide intervention that may, prima facie, be
considered violations of that same moral code. Cholbi writes:
I...argue that certain psychological features strongly associated 
with suicidal behaviour may sometimes necessitate methods of 
intervention that violate suicidal individuals’ autonomy in ways 
Kantians generally find objectionable. But this conclusion can be 
avoided by seeing the threat of suicide as a non-ideal circumstance 
to which Kantian moral theory can be applied. In particular, once 
armed with a distinction between living Kant’s ideal of a Kingdom 
of Ends and striving for that ideal, we may in fact intervene in the 
suicidal plans of others in ways that might initially seem at odds 
with Kant’s emphasis on autonomy and choice.138
Cholbi’s article is discussed here for two reasons. First, Cholbi offers some
discussion regarding the role that psychological complexities ought to play in a Kantian
picture of suicidology with respect to suicide intervention. Secondly, Cholbi’s essay offers
an example of current literature where Kant’s inconsiderateness of irrational human beings
(most notably those who are severely mentally ill) is overlooked or underemphasized in
certain regards. Cholbi writes:
Rational agency is not only the source of value within Kantian 
moral theory, but also the essential condition for moral appraisal.
For Kantians, moral appraisal focuses on maxims, agents’ 
justificatory principles of action. Hence, any attempt to understand 
the psychology underlying suicidal behaviour through a Kantian 
lens must focus on suicidal agents’ maxims, which are themselves 
rationally chosen principles. Therefore, any attempt to draw 
substantive Kantian conclusions about the morality of suicide 
depends crucially on psychological facts surrounding suicide.139
The main point drawn from Cholbi’s article is that Kant assumes that the person who
138 Cholbi (2002), page 246.
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articulates the suicidal maxim, and who subsequently assesses it via its application to the 
categorical imperative test, is an agent that is rational. If this were not assumed, then Kant 
would be violating one of the two central tenets of his moral doctrine (see Chapter One). 
However, because this must be assumed by Kant, his account of the moral standing of 
suicide is found deficient with respect to intervention. In other words, although it is essential 
that Kant assume the rationality of those who fashion the suicidal maxim in order to be 
consistent with his own views, in reality those human beings who commit suicide are not 
always rational at the time of their suicide. Hence, a significant number of human beings 
who commit suicide may either articulate maxims that are themselves irrational, or, may 
equally not even articulate a subjective maxim in the first place. This is not to say that they 
choose not to articulate a (rational) maxim; nor is it to say that they choose not to apply their 
maxim to the moral test (if they do articulate a maxim). It is to say that such people may not 
possess the rational capacity to do either to begin with (as our thought experiment in Chapter 
Three served to demonstrate).
Although Cholbi recognizes the importance of the psychological state of the 
suicidal person in constructing intervention procedures, he never addresses the fact that such 
a person may be entirely irrational; Cholbi does suggest that certain human beings may be 
less rational than others, but his language never suggests that complete irrationality is at 
issue. Although there are surely degrees of rationality and irrationality, of primary concern 
for our purposes here is the individual that is to the greatest degree irrational (as the example 
of the severely schizophrenic child demonstrated earlier).140 Being charitable to Cholbi,
139 Ibid.
140 The passage in which Cholbi (2002) seems closest to suggesting that suicidal people who are 
mentally ill are completely irrational comes in his conclusion: “Though we can understand the 
psychology o f  suicide as resting on the absence o f  conditions fo r  unified and autonomous rational 
agency, this in turn makes many effective means o f suicide intervention morally impermissible” (page 
256, emphasis mine). I take Cholbi to be suggesting that some trace amount o f  moral agency remains 
in the suicidal person here denoted, albeit an agency that is in disunity. It seems, however, that if  
rationality were completely absent, then so too would be the person’s autonomy (since, on Kant’s 
account, rationality is a precondition for the latter’s conception), and hence any agency, whether
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however, it is assumed that all human beings who are irrational (to any degree) are
considered under his non-ideal suicide intervention policies. If this is the case, then it
follows that Cholbi is in fact considering even those people who are severely mentally ill at
the time of their suicide.
Yet, Cholbi consistently assumes that the suicidal person who is mentally ill
remains a moral agent. Since rationality is a necessary condition for Kantian moral agency,
it seems then that Cholbi takes all suicidal human beings, whether mentally ill or otherwise,
as being to a certain degree rational. However, as discussed earlier, moral agency may need
to be distinguished from moral patienthood with respect to suicidal human beings who are
irrational (severely mentally ill). Different verdicts regarding the permissibility of
intervention practices may exist for people who exhibit a “diminished rational autonomy,”141
or those “not acting with full rational autonomy,”142 and those people who are irrational. The
point for our present discussion is not to criticize Cholbi’s article, but rather to highlight the
fogginess of the issue of suicide intervention as it currently stands.
Cholbi’s objective is not to provide reasons for arguing that a Kantian moral
account of suicide is correct. Rather, for his purposes, the moral impermissibility of suicide
is largely assumed. Cholbi’s goal is rather to offer a Kantian perspective of the
permissibility and procedure of intervention in cases of suicide (especially where the “agent”
is mentally ill). Because of this, the psychological state of suicidal persons becomes of
paramount relevance. Cholbi writes:
Kant depicts the suicidal agent as calmly opting for one good, 
happiness, over another, rational autonomy. And surely there is a
unified or not, would be absent as well. Because o f  this, there is reason to argue that Cholbi does not 
consider severely irrational human beings when he speaks o f  the mentally ill. Through personal 
correspondence with Prof. Cholbi, however, it was made clear that Cholbi wants to include all people 
who are mentally ill (regardless o f  their varying degrees o f  rationality) for application o f  his non-ideal 
suicide intervention policies. In other words, although his language is somewhat misleading at times, 
and he doesn’t deal with such cases explicitly in his article, Cholbi does in fact consider extremely 
(completely) irrational people as a class o f  mentally ill people.
141 Cholbi (2002), page 253.
142 Cholbi (2002), page 256.
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kernel of truth here: by choosing to die, the suicidal agent has 
‘renounced’ her rational autonomy. She is willing the will’s demise.
But is she renouncing her autonomy in favour of some other 
“good,” in particular her happiness?143
In describing the psychological complexities of the suicidal person, Cholbi is implying that
some suicidal people are missing certain key requirements for the maintenance of rational
agency—although Cholbi is admittedly vague in his article on what exactly is missing—in
which case, attempts at intervention that appeal to reason may prove ineffective.144 Cholbi
continues:
[Suicidal agents] are no longer complete agents in a Kantian sense, 
for they lack a key ingredient of Kantian agency and a central drive 
toward self-individuation.
Thus, in the sort of suicide that especially concerned 
Kant, the usual psychological story is much more complex than he 
supposed. Agents do not simply calculate future goods and evils 
and opt for the good of death over the evils of life. Instead, the evils 
of life accumulate until the point that agents no longer feel a sense 
of attachment to their own happiness at all and are indifferent to 
their existence. It is here that a necessary condition of wilful 
Kantian agency and of rational deliberation.. .is most threatened.145
Rationality is needed for the sake of being able to succeed at executing sound (Kantian)
moral deliberation and practice. Equally, rationality is a prerequisite for maxim formation in
the first place. Even if one were to argue that all Kant demands of a moral agent, in order for
her to be able to deliberate, form maxims, and become a member of the moral Kingdom of
Ends, is that she exhibit even a very base or minimal trace amount of rationality, it has been
argued that, prima facie, some suicidal victims fail to meet these criteria.
Cholbi stresses the idea that Kantian rational persuasion may not succeed in
effective interventions with suicidal agents exhibiting diminished rational agency. For the
most part, this is so since such human beings may not be able to think rationally in the first
143 Cholbi (2002), page 247.
144 Through personal correspondence with Prof. Cholbi, it has been made clear that the key ingredient 
that mentally ill suicidal people are missing is the ability and desire to set ends for themselves. 
However, this does not denote a complete absence o f rationality; rather, Cholbi nevertheless assumes 
such people to be rational to a certain degree and, what is more, all the while moral agents.
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place, so as to be susceptible to rational persuasion. Cholbi’s suggested alternative is 
intervention through paternalistic coercion.146 As Cholbi himself notes, however, this is not 
an ideal method of intervention, but nonetheless required given the “non-ideal” 
circumstances surrounding suicides, especially where the victim is mentally ill. The point is 
that, as Cholbi recognizes, the Kantian pure practical law of morality in its original form 
represents a poor source for informing intervention practices where the suicidal person is not 
mentally healthy. Because of this, Kant’s suicidology is incomplete.
4.4 An Account of the Phenomenology of Death
People who are no acquaintances of ours are ‘dying’ daily and 
hourly. ‘Death’ is encountered as a well-known event occurring 
within-the-world. As such it remains in the inconspicuousness 
characteristic of what is encountered in an everyday fashion. The 
“they” has already stowed away an interpretation for this event. It 
talks of it in a ‘fugitive’ manner, either expressly or else in a way 
which is mostly inhibited, as if to say, “One of these days one will 
die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us”.147
Without a deep and descriptive account of the nature of death, no suicidology can properly
be termed complete. This may strike the reader as an odd or impossible requirement of an
ethic of suicide to meet. However, it proves to be one of the most relevant.
As mentioned earlier, in order to pass judgement on an action, deeming it either
right or wrong, the effect of the action must be understood. For example, when applying a
slavery maxim to the categorical imperative test, one must understand what would occur
were one to pursue the ownership of a slave—what end this action brings about, and the
nature of this outcome—in order to be well equipped to pass moral judgement in the first
place. Moreover, the consequences of acting on that maxim with respect to reason and
145 Cholbi (2002), page 251.
146 Cholbi (2002) concludes his article by writing that “since the suicidal plans o f the mentally ill 
represent non-ideal circumstances, we may act in ways that further their autonomy even i f  these 
actions are coercive, duplicitous, or manipulative” (page 256).
147 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, page 297.
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morally impermissible or otherwise. Kant’s moral doctrine does not provide such an 
account, and is therefore incomplete in this regard.
But, one may object, even if an understanding of the phenomenology of death 
were relevant, death is surely not something that can be understood. This is because, as Kant 
himself rightly declares, ‘no human being that is alive can know what it is like to be dead’. 
This objection is a fair one, and it is worthy of further attention.
4.4.2 On the Logical Opaqueness of Death
It is maintained that death is dichotomous to life. While death is the end of life, it also marks 
its antithesis, its opposite, its comparative other. When one is alive, one necessarily cannot 
be dead, and vice versa. Plainly, the result of suicide is death. But what is death? It may be 
the case that the only way to have knowledge of death (what it feels like, whether it is 
negative or positive in nature, whether it marks a terminus or a ‘new beginning,’ et cetera) is 
by being dead in the first place. Despite this worry, attempts have been made to decipher the 
nature of death from the perspective of the living. Moreover, despite how limited such 
attempts may prove in the end, all efforts must be exhausted before the establishment of a 
sound ethic of suicide is to occur.
In The Ethics o f Homicide, Philip Devine argues that it is impossible for a human 
being to rationally choose death. This is the case because death exhibits an aura of logical 
opaqueness, which prevents its direct comparison with life, preventing the agent from 
having sufficient evidence for choosing between the two competing options (life versus 
death). What Devine has in mind is that death may be conceived as a certain type of 
condition, say, non-living. However, ‘human beings cannot simply move past the 
mysteriousness surrounding death beyond the point of its opaqueness by representing it as
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annihilation’.151 In fact, our best approximations of representing death are not fruitful in the 
least. This is so, according to Devine, since no infallible logical evidence about the nature of 
death can be obtained by living human beings, and hence all attempts to rationally or 
logically understand death remain speculative.
Sleep may be thought of as similar to death in certain trivial respects, but, just 
because one wakes from sleep, the two are different in every other (relevant) respect. 
Furthermore, “apparent dying,” where one is said to have died and come back to life, also 
fails to approximate death since the resurrected agent nevertheless remains a living being in 
the end. Lastly, those who are dead (and remain so) are excluded from being able to provide 
an account of death practically by definition of their being dead; ‘Death is by logical 
necessity that from which no human being returns to give tidings’.152 If Devine is correct 
about the logical opaqueness of death, then this may result in quite a large thorn in the side 
of any doctrine that proposes to illustrate a universally applicable ethic of suicide. The above 
discussion is relevant because it highlights the severity and urgency of the worry that 
finished the previous section.
Nevertheless, before they can be confirmed, an examination of the phenomenology 
of death needs to be undertaken—in a sense the translucency o f death tentatively assumed— 
one that is as extensive as possible considering the specimen, and one that has an 
understanding of the moral standing of suicide as one of its goals. Devine considers death as 
having a logical opaqueness; yet, he does not consider any other mode of gaining knowledge 
other than logically examining first-hand empirical data. There are many other methods for 
securing knowledge, all of which being relevant to a study of the phenomenology of death. 
If we cannot penetrate the ‘opaqueness’ of death by means of logic or post hoc experience, 
perhaps there is yet much to learn by adopting psychological, or historical, or sociological,
151 Devine (1978), page 140.
152 Devine (1978), page 142.
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or biological, or pragmatic, or genetic, or metaphysical perspectives and methods of inquiry, 
et cetera. Only after such investigations have been completed should our (at least tentative) 
optimism with respect to learning the nature of death turn into hopelessness. The point is not 
that we are able to know the nature of death in its entirety, but rather that we may be able to 
know much more than we currently do, yielding a more informed ethic of suicide.
This concludes our elucidation of the four suggested improvements to Kant’s 
suicidology. In this chapter it was argued that a sound suicidology needs to account for all 
possible suicidal situations, all possible suicidal victims, inform intervention efforts, and 
account for relevant issues surrounding the phenomenology of death. These four traits were 
identified after certain corresponding shortcomings of Kant’s moral philosophy were 
revealed: his doctrine is not readily applicable to all cases of suicide equally (exemplified by 
the case of a man with rabies), does not assume a majority of suicide victims (the mentally 
ill) as deserving of moral consideration; it is uninformative to intervention procedures when 
applied to cases of suicide where the suicidal person is irrational; and it failed to give an in 
depth account of the nature of death (especially with respect to morality).
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V. Concluding Remarks
If [the problem of suicide] cannot be solved, then it is difficult to 
see how any subsequent problems, involving less intimately 
experienced objects and less fundamental conditions, can be
solved.153
As mentioned in the introduction, a large number of people have committed suicide during 
the time it took for the reader to finish reading this work. Although no formal or complete 
ethic of suicide was articulated herein, one which may have been useful to the 
aforementioned victims, four relevant criteria of a sound suicidology were identified: 
context-inclusiveness, a consideration for all possible suicidal victims, the ability to inform 
intervention procedures, and an informed understanding of the nature of death. Generally 
speaking, the first two criteria represent the need for an empirical understanding of the 
issues surrounding suicide, while the latter two demonstrate the need for further
investigation into certain phenomenological and practical issues surrounding suicide. It was 
the incompleteness of Kant’s ethic of suicide that made the identification of these criteria 
possible.
The first two criteria stress an empirical orientation towards suicidology. Each
individual case of suicide is unique and context-specific. Difficulties in applying Kant’s
general practical law of morality to all such cases were uncovered, difficulties that need to 
be overcome if an ethic of suicide is to be a sound one. Furthermore, because Kant’s ethical 
theory restricts those entities included under its moral umbrella to those who are rational and 
free, it consequently denies moral guidance and worth to human beings who are irrational or 
mentally ill. Specifically, because there exists a high correlation between mental illness and 
irrationality, and between mental illness and suicide, it was argued that Kant’s suicidology 
cannot account for those human beings who are mentally ill and commit suicide, current
153 Novak (1975), page 84.
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Canadian statistics indicating that the number of human beings falling into this demographic 
is significant. Although irrational beings may not carry moral agency, it was argued that they 
need to be considered as moral patients (at least tentatively). A sound ethic of suicide needs 
to account for all human beings who can and do commit suicide. This may mean any 
number of things in the end, from having separate moral codes for rational and irrational 
beings, rational agents exercising certain obligations towards non-rational agents (by way of 
suicide intervention, for example), or that those cases of suicide where the victim is 
irrational need not be informed by normative ethics. The result of these suggestions is the 
conclusion that much more work of the empirical kind needs to be done in these areas.
Two further aspects of a sound suicidology were argued for in Chapter Three: one 
phenomenological and the other practical. The former deals with the relevance of knowing 
what the effects of suicide are. Since, in the case of suicide, the effects include death, a 
rigorous understanding of the phenomenology of death becomes of paramount concern (at 
least to the extent that such a concept lends itself to investigation). Although some argue that 
the nature of death is impenetrable, and hence impossible to know (logically), there remain 
several alternative methods to uncover the mysteries surrounding the nature of death. These 
include an exploration of the psychological, socio-historical, biological, conceptual, and 
metaphysical aspects of death, aspects unaffected for the most part by Devine’s arguments 
for the logical opaqueness of death. Until all such avenues have been explored and their 
fruits exhausted, no ethic of suicide can be said to be complete.
The latter criterion deals with issues surrounding suicide intervention and 
prevention strategies. If suicide is deemed morally impermissible, then intervention and 
prevention strategies would necessarily need to be put into place. Because Kant’s 
suicidology restricts moral agency to rational entities, two main problems arise: first, it is not 
clear that the same moral verdict is transferable (or ought to be transferred) from rational to 
irrational entities, and, second, any means of intervention founded on rationality may not be
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effective when being applied to irrational people. For these reasons, Kant’s suicidology 
highlighted the need for exploring questions surrounding intervention procedures further, 
and made apparent the possibility that more than one ethic of suicide (complete with 
intervention strategies) may be needed in order to account for the numerous types of suicidal 
individuals.
In all, the main point has been not so much that Kant’s ethic of suicide is wrong; 
rather, it has been that Kant’s ethic of suicide is incomplete. Kant’s work has been used as a 
starting point for further investigation into the issues surrounding the moral standing of 
suicide. From an incomplete ethic of suicide emerge ideas on what to do in order to establish 
one that is complete. In this sense, although certain aspects of Kant’s moral theory remain 
beneficial to progress in this area, his shortcomings may prove to be even more valuable.
Where do we go from here? There may be more criteria than the four outlined 
herein. Because of this, further work needs to be done by way of exploring what a sound 
ethic of suicide would look like. Moreover, many of the questions raised throughout this 
work remain unanswered. Because of their centrality to understanding the moral nature of 
suicide, these questions need to continue to be asked, and answers tirelessly sought. In order 
to do this, we must assume the problematicity of suicide—especially where intervention is 
concerned—as well that all human beings who commit suicide need to be accounted for, and 
that the phenomenology of death is translucent rather than opaque. If further research offers 
reason to refine current suicidologies away from such assumptions, then so be it. The goal 
for now ought to be the establishment of an ethic of suicide that is compatible with the 
criteria outlined above; in order to do this, extensive research needs to be conducted, 
whether empirical, phenomenological or otherwise.
If suicide is immoral, and if we ought to prevent it, then we need to take measures 
to put ourselves in a position to do so. If we ought not to prevent suicide, this is to say, if 
suicide is a moral (or amoral) human act, then we need to direct academic, financial,
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educational, social, and political attention and labour to the issue accordingly. The main 
emphasis throughout this work has been to ask some of the questions that have habitually 
gone unasked or been underemphasized with respect to suicide, questions central to 
resolving the issues surrounding suicide. Is suicide a problem, whether social or 
philosophical (moral)? Is death positive or negative in nature? Who needs to be accounted
for under an ethic of suicide? What would the theoretical and practical designs of a sound
ethic of suicide look like? Because of its inability to attend to such questions, Kant’s 
suicidology has been identified as being incomplete.
As the words of Albert Camus opened this work, it is only fitting that they close it
as well:
[The problem of suicide] may seem both simple and insoluble. But 
it is wrongly assumed that simple questions involve answers that 
are no less simple and that evidence implies evidence. A priori and 
reversing the terms of the problem, just as one does or does not kill 
oneself, it seems that there are but two philosophical solutions,
either yes or no. This would be too easy. But allowance must be 
made for those who, without concluding, continue questioning.154
154 Camus (1975), page 14.
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